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“Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of
its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”
- Abraham Lincoln, in a message to Congress, July 4, 1861
INTRODUCTION
The pages of twentieth century history are replete with the tragedy
of Western democracy’s struggle against terrorist wars of attrition
1
waged in the name of nationalism. In the face of those threats, the
failure of many state responses has often led governments to resign
2
themselves to policies of containment. However, the attacks of
September 11, 2001, illustrated that globalization has largely
rendered that approach impotent due to the advent of international
networks of terrorist organizations that have unprecedented
3
resources at their disposal. Consequently, the nations of the world
1. See PETER CHALK, WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE
EVOLVING DYNAMIC 5 (1996) (noting the pervasive presence of nationalist terrorism
throughout Western Europe); Naeomi Gal-Or, Introduction to TOLERATING TERRORISM
IN THE WEST: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY xiii (Naeomi Gal-Or ed., 1991) (observing
that terrorism has become a fact of daily life in much of the western hemisphere);
ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL
ANALYSIS 4 (1992) (analyzing the legal responses of Spain, France, Italy, Germany,
and the United Kingdom to the threat of political violence). Vercher notes that the
incidence of terrorist activity increased in the early 1990s. Id. at 1. See PAUL
WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 17 (2000)
(providing that “[t]he predominant form of armed conflict in the contemporary
world is intrastate rather than interstate, and the overwhelming majority of
insurgencies are ethnic or ethnoreligious in their underlying motivation.”).
2. See GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN
IRELAND 6-7 (1989) (noting the sporadic employment of emergency anti-terrorism
measures during periods of unusual violence).
3. See CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION x
(2002) (defining the phenomenon of “Third Millennium Terrorism” as that which
emerges “through non-national, global networks and with aspirations which are
likewise distanced from place and time”). Walker states that this notion of Third
Millennium Terrorism serves to complement “modernist, nationalist terrorism, the
prime exponent for most of the twentieth century” in that “threats of globalisation
will ensure that cultural and national causes remain vibrant [and further observes
that] [t]he attacks and scares of autumn 2001 . . . sharpened the desire for security.”
Id. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 119 (noting the ease with which terrorists,
particularly within the European Union, can transport their bases of operation and
their capital between countries in order to evade capture); see also Emanuel Marotta,
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have had to consider, with renewed vigor, how to confront the
epidemic of nationalist terrorism and the effects that this new face of
terrorism will have on civil rights, the rule of law, and the principles
4
of democracy upon which they rest. International Human Rights
law, particularly in the European context, has assumed a growing role
in the tenuous reconciliation of necessary state repression and the
preservation of the very rights that the state purports to protect, and
introduces another tier to the debate concerning the employment of
5
In light of the increasingly
counter-terrorism measures.
international nature of terrorism, an understanding of the
international legal response to the issue of counter-terrorism will be
crucial for states in creating effective anti-terrorism legislation that
6
comports with the rule of law. Recent legislation passed in Spain
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the struggle of the modern
Western democracy to reconcile anti-terrorist measures with
Europol’s Role in Anti-Terrorism Policing, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter
1999, at 15 (stating that “[w]e only have to consider recent events to see the truly
international nature of terrorism and its lack of respect for national boundaries.”);
Max Taylor & John Horgan, Future Developments of Political Terrorism in Europe,
TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 83, 86 (asserting that
“[n]ationalism, religion, and ethnicity are in our view the powerful forces which will
drive future international terrorism in Europe.”); David Veness, Low Intensity and
High Impact Conflict, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 8 (articulating
the new challenges in modern counter-terrorism policy engendered by the evolution
of means, motives, and opportunities for terrorism since its emergence in the 1960s).
4. See CHALK, supra note 1, at xii (postulating that “some of the potential
responses to terrorism could pose an equal, if not a greater, threat to democratic
norms than does terrorism itself.”); see also CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, CONSEQUENCES OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 123 (1993) (identifying the choice regarding the degree to
which a state is prepared to restrict the civil liberties of its citizens as one of the most
important policy choices that a government can make); WILKINSON, supra note 1, at
230 (stating that “[t]he tightrope between under-reaction . . . and draconian
overreaction, leading to serious infringement of civil liberties . . . is pitched at a
different height and angle in each case.”); Fernando Jimenez, Spain: The Terrorist
Challenge and the Government’s Response, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 110, 12829 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1993) (exhorting governments to
adhere to the rule of law in their efforts to combat terrorism); Dennis P. Riordan,
The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under the Spanish Constitution and the
European Convention of Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 376 (1998)
(maintaining that “no rubric is more commonly used by states to trample on the
fundamental rights of their citizens, particularly those of ethnic minorities, than that
of the struggle against terrorism.”).
5. See Graham Head, ‘The Future is Bright . . .’—But Whom For?, TERRORISM &
POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 19, 22 (noting the increasing integration of the
European Court of Human Rights into legal rulings and its increasing relevance in
British law); Marotta, supra note 3, at 16-17 (noting increased cooperation among
European Union members regarding counter-terrorism as evidenced in the Europol
Convention).
6. See Head, supra note 5, at 22 (identifying the increasing influence of the
European Convention on Human Rights on legal rulings, particularly in light of the
need for a uniform international system of checks and balances on counter-terrorism
techniques).
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fundamental civil rights, in a context that typifies the changing face
7
of twentieth century terrorism.
On August 23, 2002, Judge Baltásar Garzón of Spain’s Audiencia
8
Nacional [National Court] issued an order suspending Batasuna, the
political front for the terrorist organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuma
9
(“E.T.A.”) [Basque Fatherland and Liberty]. This ruling came nearly
three months after Spain’s Congress passed the Ley Orgánica de
Partidos Políticos [Law of Political Parties] by an overwhelming ninety10
five percent majority on June 4, 2002. The law, recently declared
11
constitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court, provided the
12
legislative predicate upon which the Spanish Supreme Court based
13
This
its definitive proscription of Batasuna in March, 2003.
7. See Shlomo Ben-Ami, Introduction to ETHNIC CHALLENGES TO THE MODERN
NATION STATE 3 (Shlomo Ben-Ami et al. eds., 2000) (explaining that Europe’s
immediate challenge is “that of reconciling the community’s natural diversity and
the inevitable emphasis . . . on political self-determination . . . and the search for a
unifying ethic . . . .”). The ethno-identity conflict of the Basque population and the
expression that it finds in the violent separatist movement fit the paradigm for the
future of European terrorism that recent scholarship has promulgated. See id.
(noting that we live in an “age of self-determination brought to its extreme”). The
author cites the insolubility of Basque nationalism as exemplary of that assertion and
identifies it as the strongest nationalist cause in Western Europe. Id. See Taylor &
Horgan, supra note 3, at 86 (identifying nationalism as the driving cause behind
modern European terrorism).
8. See JUZGADO CENTRAL DE INSTRUCCIÓN NO. 5, AUTO [CENTRAL COURT
PROCEEDINGS NO. 5, ORDER], p. 344 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter ORDER]
(determining that the suspension period would last for three years and could be
renewed up to five years for Batasuna and its predecessor parties), at
http://parlamento.euskadi.net/actual/auto20020826.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
9. Anthony Richards, Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the
Peace Process and Democracy, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 2001, at 72, 73
(arguing that the term “political wing” is unsatisfactory in labeling groups such as
Sinn Fein and Batasuna as it fails to reflect the fact such political fronts are
subordinate to their corresponding terrorist organizations and often emerge from
within them).
10. Ley Orgánica de Partídos Políticos (“L.O.P.P.”), (B.O.E., 2002, 154) (Spain)
(replacing an existing law with new procedures to dissolve a political party that fails
to respect democratic principles and human rights), available at http://www.igsap.
map.es/cia/dispo/106-02.htm (last visited July 20, 2003) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
11. On March 12, 2003, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling rejecting the
Basque Government’s contention that the Law of Political Parties violates various
provisions of the Spanish Constitution. S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003),
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review). See EL T.C. DECLARA CONSTITUCIONAL LA LEY DE PARTIDOS
POLÍTICOS [THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECLARES THE LAW OF POLITICAL PARTIES
CONSTITUTIONAL] Iurislex (Mar. 14, 2003), at http://www.iurislex.net (on file with
the American University Law Review).
12. See id. art. 11 (conferring upon the Government and the Public Prosecutor
the exclusive power to present to the Supreme Court a petition for the proscription
of a political party).
13. TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, SENTENCIA, ILEGALIZACIÓN DE LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS
HERRI BATASUNA, EUSKAL HERRITARROK Y BATASUNA [SUPREME COURT, JUDGMENT,
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condemnation represents the first of its kind since Spain returned to
14
democracy in 1975.
While the overwhelming majority of the Spanish citizenry supports
Batasuna’s proscription, Batasuna and other groups in the Basque
15
Country have mounted staunch opposition. On September 9, 2003,
the Basque Autonomous Government announced its intention to
appeal the Constitutional Court’s ruling before the European Court
16
of Human Rights (“E.C.H.R.”).
Should the E.C.H.R. admit the
complaint, the case would represent the first time in the Court’s
history that it has heard a claim instituted by a regional government
17
against its own central State.
ILLEGALIZATION OF THE POLITICALo PARTIES HERRI BATASUNA, BASQUE CITIZENS AND
BATASUNA], Autos acumulados n 6/2002 y 7/2002 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT] (describing the procedural history in the Spanish courts
that ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision to dissolve Batasuna), at
http://www.poderjudicial.es/tribunalsupremo (on file with the American University
Law Review).
14. See United in Error: Spain’s Ban on Batasuna Will Not Help, GUARDIAN (London)
(Aug. 28, 2002) (arguing that the ban is unprecedented and recommending a more
conciliatory approach to the regulation of party activity), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,2763,781601,0.00.html (on file with the
American University Law Review). From the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War in
1939 until the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain existed as a totalitarian
dictatorship. JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ JIMÉNEZ, LA ESPAÑA CONTEMPORÁNEA: DE 1931 A NUESTROS
DÍAS [CONTEMPORARY SPAIN: FROM 1931 TO THE PRESENT] 247 (1991). The period
preceding Franco’s death in 1975 was characterized as one of “double crisis,” in the
economic and political spheres. Id. at 373-74 (noting that the country suffered from
a period of unprecedented inflation and political unrest). Anticipating Franco’s
impending death, various opposition parties began to mobilize resources creating
unified platforms from which to forge a new democracy. Id. at 383 (observing that
the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Party joined forces
in 1974 to create the short lived “Unitary Platform”). While this new atmosphere of
freedom paved the way for Spain’s democratization, it also provided an opportunity
for the nationalists to voice their agenda. See Fernando Reinares & Oscar Jaime
Jiménez, Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy: The Case of Spain, in EUROPEAN
DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM 119, 125 (Fernando Reinares ed., 2000) (noting
that this political expression most commonly came in the form of terrorist violence
which escalated markedly between 1978 and 1980).
15. El Gobierno vasco se querella contra Garzón por sus autos sobre Batasuna [The Basque
Government Files Charges Against Garzón for his Edicts Against Batasuna], EL PAÍS
(Madrid) (Oct. 18, 2002) (reporting that the Basque government has filed charges of
prevarication against Judge Garzón), available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo.
html?xref=20021018 (on file with the American University Law Review).
Prevarication, one of the most egregious charges that a party can bring against a
judge or magistrate, essentially alleges that the judge has knowingly or negligently
issued an unjust ruling. Id.
16. El Gobierno vasco sale en defensa de Batasuna al recurrir en Europa la Ley de partidos
políticos [The Basque Government Comes to Batasuna’s Defense, Challenging the Law of
Political Parties in Europe, EL MUNDO (Madrid) (Sept. 10, 2003) ] [hereinafter
Batasuna’s Defense], available at http://www.abc.es (on file with the American
University Law Review).
17. El Gobierno Vasco presenta la demanda al estado español en Estrasburgo [Basque
Government Files Claim Against the Spanish State In Strasbourg], ESTRELLA DIGITAL, Sept.
10, 2003, at http://www.estrelladigital.es/articulo.asp?sec=esp&fech=10/09/03&
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In examining the controversial Law of Political Parties and the
subsequent actions of the Spanish judiciary, this Comment will situate
those decisions in an appropriate legal and political framework with
reference to Spanish law and European human rights doctrine. It
will further attempt to lend insight into the potential international
import of the decision. Part I of this Comment explores the history
of E.T.A. and the evolution of Batasuna. Part II examines the
legislative and judicial movements that have culminated in the
Spanish judiciary’s most recent action. In defending the proscription
of Batasuna, Part III examines the human rights concerns that this
18
decision has awakened in light of recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the arguments in favor of and against
proscription and its efficacy as a weapon in the struggle against
terrorism and concludes that the proscription of Batasuna is both a
sound and necessary step in bringing an end to Spain’s forty-year
battle against political terrorism.
I.

E.T.A. AND BATASUNA: A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE

E.T.A., one of the oldest operating Western European terrorist
groups, is a separatist organization fighting for Basque independence
19
E.T.A. was formed in Bilbao by a group of young
from Spain.
20
members of the journal, Ekin [Action]. They hoped to create a new
name=espana1 (on file with the American University Law Review).
18. This Comment is primarily concerned with the notion of political
proscription as a method of combating political violence in Western democracies. As
the constitutionality of these measures will vary pursuant to the domestic constitution
at issue, this Comment confines its analysis largely to the decision’s consonance with
E.C.H.R. jurisprudence.
19. See Jiménez, supra note 4, at 111-12 (providing a cursory history of E.T.A.’s
historical development); Ludger Mees, Between Votes and Bullets. Confronting Ethnic
Identities in the Basque Country, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 798, 800 (2001) (tracing
the historic origins of the Basque conflict to the beginning of Spanish state building
in the fifteenth century). Mees also notes that until the late nineteenth century, the
Basques succeeded in maintaining a traditional and extensive system of selfgovernment known as the “Fueros.” Id. at 801. The abolition of this system in 1876
engendered a “cultural renaissance” which paved the way for the more politicized
and radical nationalist movements that followed. Id. at 802, 806; see Fernando
Reinares, Nationalism and Violence in Basque Politics, 8 CONFLICT 141, 141 (1988)
(chronicling the evolution of Basque nationalism from its emergence at the end of
the nineteenth century until its manifestations in modern terrorism).
20. See Michael Wierviorka, E.T.A. and Basque Political Violence, in THE
LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE, 292, 296-98 (David E. Apter ed., 1997) (explaining that
the students editing the journal Action established groups in various cities in the
Basque Country and then combined with the PNV youth organization Egi to form
E.T.A.); La ofensiva terrorista: De la universidad a la ‘acción armada’ [The Terrorist
Offensive: From the University to “Armed Action”], EL PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter Terrorist
Offensive] (stating that the foundation of Action took place in 1952 at the Jesuit
University of Deusto), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los50.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
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21

nationalist organization that would free the Partido Nacionalista Vasco
(“P.N.V.”)[Basque Nationalist Party] from the quagmire in which it
22
On July 31,
was entrenched during Franco’s oppressive regime.
1959 the young dissidents formed E.T.A. on four basic principles: the
defense of Euskera [the Basque language], ethnocentrism, antiSpanish ideology, and the independence of the territory claimed by
the Basques, including the northern Spanish provinces of the Basque
Country and Navarra as well as the French provinces of Basse23
Navarra, Labourd and Soule. E.T.A. openly espoused the notion of
the lucha armada [armed struggle] and committed its first act of
24
terrorism on July 18, 1961. The attack was a failed attempt to derail
a train of Franco’s volunteers en route to San Sebastian for the
commemoration of the military strike that gave rise to the Spanish
25
Civil War in 1936.
Due to the internal ideological schism that occurred between 1972
and 1974, the group split into two factions, the “political-military”
26
branch and the “E.T.A.-militia” (E.T.A.-M). The political-military
21. Prior to the birth of E.T.A., the P.N.V. existed as the lone political force
advocating for the Basque nationalist cause. See Wierviorka, supra note 20, at 296
(explaining the birth of E.T.A. as a product of the crisis within traditional Basque
nationalist institutions and the sentiments of impotence that that crisis engendered).
Wierviorka goes on to note that as the P.N.V. became increasingly marginalized from
the regime, internal discord grew, ultimately resulting in the emergence of a
contingent of critical younger members disillusioned by the impotence of its party.
Id. The students, editors of the journal Action, formally broke ties with the P.N.V.
and formed E.T.A. in order to vindicate the Basque identity and cultural heritage.
Id. at 297-98.
22. See CHALK, supra note 1, at 55 (explaining that under Franco’s regime, which
lasted from 1939-1975, “the use of the Euskera language was ruthlessly suppressed in
an attempt to eliminate a regionalism which was seen to represent a fundamental
threat to the Fascist Falange”). This attack on what Basques regarded as the pillar of
their culture provided grist for the terrorist mill that E.T.A. was to become. Id.
23. See Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country, in
DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 55, 56 (Michael O’Neill & Dennis Austin eds.,
2000) (tracing Basque claims of sovereignty to their status as the only remaining preAryan race in Europe). Guibernau also notes that the Basque language is the only
pre-Indo-European language still used within Europe. Id. See also VERCHER, supra
note 1, at 168 (stating that “E.T.A. patterns itself somewhat after the I.R.A. and that
some observers have described E.T.A.’s short-range goal as one of trying to
‘Ulsterize’ the Basque region, i.e., provoke a military intervention to pacify the
area.”). “E.T.A. expects that such intervention would irretrievably alienate the
Basque population and rally further support for E.T.A. against central authority.” Id.
See generally Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20 (recounting the history of the Basque
separatist movement).
24. See Reinares, supra note 19, at 144-46 (tracing the origins of E.T.A.); Terrorist
Offensive, supra note 20 (summarizing the significant chronological history of E.T.A.’s
terrorist offensive).
25. See Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20 (reporting that the failed attack resulted
in immediate escalation of police action leading to the arrest of the group’s
directorate and nearly to its dissolution).
26. Primera gran escisión y comienzo de las acciones indiscriminadas [The Terrorist
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branch advocated a combination of the political structure typical of a
legitimate organization with political pressure in the form of violence
(excluding individual targets) while E.T.A.-M espoused a policy of
27
“legitimate” violence. In 1973, shortly after its formation, E.T.A.’s
operatives assassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, the President of the
28
This pattern of
Government and Franco’s designated successor.
violence has continued without respite and, since its inception, E.T.A.
has claimed responsibility for 3,391 terrorist attacks that have killed
29
836 people and injured 2,367.
The first political arm of E.T.A. emerged in 1976, in the Irish
30
tradition of Sinn Fein, and the three subsequent years produced at
31
least 82 other legal organizations. In April, 1978, four of the radical
nationalist Basque parties formed a coalition group on behalf of
E.T.A. This group, Herri Batasuna (“H.B.”), later became the
32
principal political wing of E.T.A. H.B. promoted a nationalist policy
founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology and espoused five central, nonnegotiable tenets:
1. Legalization of all Basque parties.
2. Expulsion of all national police forces from the Basque
territory.
3. Recognition of Basque national sovereignty, the right to
self-determination, and the creation of an independent
state that would include Navarra and the provinces of the
French Basque Country.
4. Improvement of conditions for Basque workers.

Offensive: First Great Split and Beginning of Indiscriminate Actions], EL PAÍS (Madrid),
available at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los70.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Reinares, supra note 19, at 148 (noting that the assassination of
Franco’s successor destroyed the nascent government’s aspirations of continuity,
bringing political uncertainty to the regime).
29. Clausurada la sede de Batasuna en Pamplona y ocho más en el resto de Navarra
[Batasuna Headquarters in Pamplona and Eight Others in the Rest of Navarra Closed], EL
MUNDO (Madrid), at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/08/26/espana/
1030359464.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University
Law Review).
30. See Mees, supra note 19, at 810 (quoting Batasuna’s spokesman Arnaldo Otegi
as stating that “Ireland was a mirror for us, and so was the republican movement.”).
Mees notes that social movements, including nationalist movements, possess a
“cumulative power” which “not only repeat[s] many of the themes of their
predecessors . . . but build[s] on the practices and themes of the past.” Id. at 809.
31. Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20.
32. Id. (elaborating that this coalition decided to form an official political party
in 1980 but was unable to secure official recognition until 1986).
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5. Declaration of Euskera as the official and primary language
33
of the Basque Country.
The coalition’s strategic long-range agenda was to effect total Basque
34
autonomy from Spain.
The 1980s represented the bloodiest decade in the history of the
35
organization. During this period, E.T.A. embarked on a campaign
of indiscriminate violence, employing execution-style assassinations
36
and car bombings. On June 19, 1987, the group placed a car bomb
outside of a major department store in Barcelona, resulting in twenty37
one dead and more than forty-five wounded.
The 1990s saw the arrival of a new strategy under which E.T.A.
based its actions on the maintenance of armed conflict as an end in
itself and also broadened its list of potential targets, previously
limited to members of security forces, to include politicians, members

33. Id.; see also Reinares, supra note 19, at 149 (noting that H.B.’s policy, in
support of E.T.A.’s cause, was to decline any legislative seats that it claimed in
elections); Wieviorka, supra note 20, at 325 (explaining that H.B., closely linked to
E.T.A., employed its political weight to promote E.T.A.’s cause in various arenas
including trade unions, women’s movements, anti-nuclear movements and Basque
cultural movements).
34. Peter Waldmann, From the Vindication of Honor to Blackmail: The Changing Role
of E.T.A. On Society and Politics in the Basque Region of Spain, in TOLERATING TERRORISM
IN THE WEST: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1, 11 (explaining E.T.A.’s
short- and long-term strategies). Shortly after Garzón issued his order, Juan Jose
Ibarretxe, the lehendakari [president] of the Basque Country, put forth a proposal for
a “State of Free Association.” Ibarretxe plantea convertir Euskadi en un Estado libre
asociado con una justicia propia [Ibarretxe Proposes the Conversion of Euskadi into a “State of
Free Association” with its Own Judiciary], EL MUNDO (Madrid), (Sept. 27, 2002), available
at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/09/27/espana/1033120813.html (on
file with the American University Law Review). The plan would confer upon the
Basque Country a status similar to that of a federal state and has as its objective the
achievement of “shared sovereignty” with the central Spanish state. Id. However, the
European Union has already demonstrated its disapproval of such a plan. On
October 22, 2002, the European Commission adopted unanimously a declaration
stating that Ibarretxe’s plan is incompatible with the Treaty of the European Union.
La Comisión Europea asegura que el plan de Ibarretxe es incompatible con el tratado de la U.E.
[The European Commission Assures that Ibarretxe’s Plan is Incompatible with the E.U.
Treaty], ESTRELLA DIGITAL, Oct. 23, 2002 [hereinafter Ibarretxe’s Plan], at
http://www.estrelladigital.es/021023/articulos/espana/espana1.asp.
35. La ofensiva más sangrienta, los G.A.L. y las confrontaciones de Argel [The Bloodiest
Offensive, the G.A.L. and the Confrontations of Argel], EL PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter
Bloodiest Offensive], at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los80.html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). It is
interesting to note that 1980, the year that the first autonomous elections for the
Basque Parliament took place, witnessed the most deaths from terrorism of any year
between the period 1968 and 1986. See Maria J. Funes, Social Responses to Political
Violence in the Basque Country, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 493, 495 (1998) (recording a
marked increase in violence during the transition period and years of nascent
democracy); Reinares, supra note 19, at 151 (reporting that 96 people died in
terrorist attacks in 1980).
36. Bloodiest Offensive, supra note 35.
37. Id.
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of the judiciary, civil servants, and journalists.
Throughout its
twenty-year existence, H.B. maintained a symbiotic relationship with
E.T.A., often including known or incarcerated E.T.A. members on its
39
ballots.
In 1996, Judge Garzón established an affirmative link
between H.B. and E.T.A., unveiling an E.T.A. propaganda campaign
in which the political party participated.
E.T.A. produced a
videotape that H.B. distributed to public and private television
stations for broadcast during free air time delegated for use by
40
This
political parties in anticipation of an upcoming election.
discovery resulted in the prosecution and incarceration of the H.B.
41
National Cabinet.
In 1998, only months after the dissipation of H.B. due to the
conviction and imprisonment of its National Cabinet, Euskal
Herritarrok (“E.H.”) [Basque citizens], a new electoral platform
42
appeared in Bilbao.
The new party subsumed the remaining
43
vestiges of H.B. and adopted the ideology of its predecessor.
Neither the Spanish political directorate nor the public doubted
E.H.’s existence as the political guise under which H.B. continued to
44
operate.
On September 12, 1998 the Basque nationalists and the Euskal
Herritarrok, along with the Izquierda Unida [United Left] and other
organizations, signed the Estella-Lizarra Pact in which they pledged to
search for a negotiated solution to the violence plaguing the Basque
45
Country. Only days after signing the pact, E.T.A. announced an
46
indefinite unilateral cease-fire. The cease-fire lasted nearly fifteen
38. El golpe de Bidart [Bidart’s Coup], EL PAÍS [hereinafter Bidart’s Coup]
(reporting that between 1995 and 2000, twelve members of the Partido Popular
[Popular Party] and the ex-president of the Constitutional Court died at the hands of
E.T.A.), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los90.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
39. See Waldmann, supra note 34, at 11-13 (noting the extensive connections that
existed between E.T.A. and its political front H.B.). H.B. received contributions
from E.T.A.’s coffers and H.B. has assisted in the construction of arms and supply
depots. Id. at 12.
40. El entorno político de E.T.A: HB/EH [E.T.A.’s Political Environment: HB/EH], EL
PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter E.T.A.’s Political Environment], at http://www.elpais.es/
temas/eta/menua/a2/hbeh.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
41. El entorno de E.T.A. [E.T.A.’s Environment], EL MUNDO (Madrid) (noting that
at the time of the discovery much of the Basque population supported the
proscription of H.B.), at http://w3.el-mundo.es/eta/entornobatasuna.html (last
visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
42. E.T.A.’s Political Environment, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38.
46. See Mees, supra note 19, at 799 (noting the significance of the cease-fire as the
first serious attempt at reconciliation since the emergence of Basque political
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months until, on November 28, 1999, E.T.A. announced that its
47
operatives would return to action. E.T.A. consummated this threat
on January 21, 2000 with the assassination of an army lieutenant
48
colonel in Madrid. On December 12 of the same year, in response
to 23 assassinations since the previous January, the various national
political parties, the Partido Popular (“P.P.”) [Popular Party] and the
Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles (“P.S.O.E.”) [Spanish Workers
Socialist Party], signed the Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo
[Agreement for Freedom and Against Terrorism] in which these
traditionally antagonistic parties pledged to work together to design a
49
common strategy.
E.T.A. responded to the pact with the
assassination of a politician in Barcelona within 48 hours of its
50
signing.
Three years after the birth of E.H., the elections of May 2001
produced the worst results that the party, in any of its forms, had
51
witnessed in its twenty-two year existence. One month after E.H.’s
52
electoral debacle, Batasuna emerged as its successor, inheriting a
political history defined by its inextricable links to E.T.A. and the
53
imprimatur of complicity that such a history confers.
violence); 15 meses sin muertos [15 Months Without Deaths], EL PAÍS (Madrid)
(reporting that during the fifteen-month cease-fire more than 100 prisoners were
released from prison, eighty-two of whom were serving preventative detentions and
twenty-three others who were released at the discretion of the government), at
http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a2/15meses.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
47. See Mees, supra note 19, at 799 (lamenting the return to violence, which
marked the conclusion of a year without fatalities and was characterized by
clandestine communications between the government and paramilitaries and the
employment of increasingly institutionalized discourse); Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38.
48. See Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38 (explaining that the assassination was the first
in a series of attacks that eventually resulted in the abandonment of the Lizarra Pact).
49. See La anterior legislatura vasca El PP y el PSOE asumen juntos por primera vez y con
un pacto la política antiterrorista [The Prior Basque Legislature The PP and the PSOE
Confront Antiterrorist Politics Together for the First Time with Nonpartisan Pact], EL PAÍS
(Madrid) (providing a history of legislative agreements between political parties in
their effort to create a united front with which to combat terrorism), at
http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a2/pacto.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
50. Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38.
51. E.T.A.’s Political Environment, supra note 40 (noting that the party garnered
only seven parliamentary seats as compared to 14 in the previous election).
52. Id. (highlighting the relationship between E.T.A. and its various political
fronts).
53. E.T.A.’s connection with H.B./E.H./Batasuna was not merely political but
also economic. E.T.A. financed the party until 1992. After 1992, such subsides
continued by way of a complex business structure known as the Proyecto Udaletxe
[Udaletxe Project]. ORDER, supra note 8, HECHOS [FACTS] para. 1.4. Also, before its
transformation into Batasuna, H.B. routinely included various members of E.T.A. on
its election ballots. For example, in the Basque Parliamentary elections of 1980, H.B.
included on its ticket two members of E.T.A. who at the time of the election were
serving prison sentences for their involvement in terrorist activity. Id. para. 2. The
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Today, E.T.A. maintains extensive international connections, and
54
reportedly has ties to the I.R.A. Its members have attended Middle
Eastern terrorist training camps, and the Castro government has, on
55
occasion, provided safe haven and training for E.T.A. members.
II. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PANORAMA IN SPAIN
A. The Constitution of 1978: The Rebirth of Democracy
While modern Spanish constitutional tradition finds its roots in the
early nineteenth century, the modern democratic era began with the
56
adoption of the 1978 Constitution.
The new Constitution,
composed of ten parts divided into chapters and articles, extended
political freedoms through which the government provided for the
right of political association and the freedom of expression following
57
the legalization of political parties.
The Constitution contains three basic classes of rights:
fundamental rights, constitutional rights, and those rights associated
58
with social and economic policy.
Each class of rights enjoys a
corresponding degree of constitutional protection. The fundamental
rights appear in Chapter Two of Part I of the Constitution, entitled
“Fundamental Rights and Duties.” That chapter enshrines the
59
60
freedoms of political parties and of association.
existence of H.B., since its inception, as E.T.A.’s “institutional front” is further
evidenced in various texts compiled from E.T.A.’s official publication “Zutabe.” Id.
Cited excerpts from the publication reveal the political party’s subordination to the
directives of the terrorist organization. Id. The magazine contains a section
dedicated to “KAS meetings.” The June 1978 issue included a reference to the
campaign strategy of H.B. E.T.A. dictated that the political party would employ the
slogan, “Frente a la Constitución, la Alternativa” [Against the Constitution, the
Alternative]. Id.
54. Jimenez, supra note 4, at 112 (noting in addition the international
connections that E.T.A. allegedly maintains with groups in Nicaragua, Cuba, France,
and the Middle East).
55. Id.
56. See generally CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, THE SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SPANISH LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM vii (1999) (tracing the origins
of Spanish constitutionalism and explaining the significance of the 1978
Constitution).
57. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA (“C.E.”) arts. 6 & 20 (Spain) (enshrining the
legalization of political parties and the freedom of expression, respectively); see also
VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 18 (noting that the liberal atmosphere of the post-Franco
political regime influenced the creation of the 1978 Constitution).
58. See ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (1996) (noting that
citizens may plead violations of fundamental rights in the Constitutional Court but
must plead violations of other rights pursuant to ordinary proceedings); see also
VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 25-26 (noting that the first title establishes that all rights
that the Constitution affords are not held in equal regard). No law may contradict
the basic contents of these rights. Id.
59. C.E. art. 6. Article 6 states:
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The Constitution accords this class of fundamental rights the
highest form of protection, allowing for their regulation only through
61
Article 10 requires that the
the passage of an Organic Law.
interpretation of all fundamental rights and freedoms conform to the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all
62
other international treaties ratified in Spain.
Finally, Chapter Five of Part I provides for those circumstances
under which the government may suspend the rights and liberties of
63
citizens.
It is within this constitutional framework that this
Comment seeks to evaluate the proscription of Batasuna.
B. Legislative and Judicial Actions: The Path to Proscription
1.

The Law of Political Parties
64
The Spanish Congress approved the Law of Political Parties on
65
June 4, 2002 by an overwhelming 95 percent majority. The law,
effective on June 27, 2002, served to amend the existing law that had
66
governed political parties since its passage in 1978. The new law
Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to
the formation and expression of the will of the people[,] and [they] are an
essential instrument for political participation. Their creation and the
exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution
and the law. Their internal structure and their functioning must be
democratic.
Id.
60. C.E. art. 22 (providing that “[a]ssociations which pursue ends or use means
legally defined as criminal offenses are illegal.”). It also prohibits all associations of a
paramilitary nature. Id. Article 22 expressly contemplates the suspension of an
association’s activities and also its dissolution upon the issuance of a court order. Id.
61. See C.E. art. 81.1 (providing that leyes organicas [organic laws] regulate
fundamental rights and civil liberties, ratify Statutes of Autonomy, the general
electoral regime, and any other matter for which the Constitution provides); see also
MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 31 (explaining that an Organic Law requires the
approval of an absolute majority of the Congress whereas ordinary legislation
requires only a simple majority). Additionally, an Organic Law relates specifically to
certain subject matters specified by the Constitution such as fundamental rights. Id.
Any ordinary law that sought to regulate a matter which, pursuant to the
Constitution, required an Organic Law for regulation, would be unconstitutional per
se. Id. at 32.
62. C.E. art. 10.
63. C.E. art. 55 (providing for the suspension of the rights enshrined in articles
17.2, 18.2, and 18.3 pursuant to the passage of an organic law).
64. LEY ORGÁNICA DE PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS (Spain) (“L.O.P.P.”).
65. See Batasuna proceso de ilegalización [Batasuna: The Proscription Process], EL
MUNDO (Madrid) (providing a chronology of salient events that facilitated the
potential proscription of Batasuna), at http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2002/
08/espana/batasuna/claves.html (last visited July 2, 2003) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
66. See L.O.P.P. Exposición de Motivos [Purpose Statement] sec. I (stating that
the 1978 version of the law had become antiquated and insufficient to provide for
the modern political climate).
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regulates the creation, activities, and dissolution of all registered
67
political parties. With regard to dissolution, the law provides that
only the Public Prosecutor or the Government, at the behest of the
68
Congress of Deputies or the Senate, may submit a complaint to a
special panel of the Supreme Court requesting the definitive
69
proscription of a political party. Upon receiving the complaint, the
Supreme Court will then notify the party of the proceeding against it,
70
at which time it will have eight days to respond. When a response is
received, the court will consider the original complaint and may then
71
rule on its admissibility. Once the court admits the complaint, it
may then initiate a discretionary period of discovery upon the
72
conclusion of which it has twenty days to issue an order. The law
provides that a ruling of illegality will take immediate effect and
affords no right of appeal with the exception of the “recurso de
73
74
amparo” [protective appeal] before the Constitutional Court.
67. See L.O.P.P. art. 11.1 (conferring upon the government and the Public
Prosecutor the exclusive authority to request judicial dissolution of a political party).
Criminal proceedings in Spain, such as those in the instant case, consist of three
denominations of offenses: public, semi-public, and private. VILLIERS, supra note 56,
at 137. These classifications determine who must proceed with prosecution. Id. The
Ministerio Fiscal [Public Prosecutor] generally files and prosecutes the majority of all
cases. Id.
68. L.O.P.P. art. 11.1 to 11.2.
69. See id. art. 11.2 (establishing a Supreme Court “special panel” as the entity
empowered to order the definitive dissolution of a party); see also LEY ORGÁNICA DEL
PODER JUDICIAL (“L.O.P.J.”) art. 61 (Spain) (providing that a special panel of the
Supreme Court shall consist of the President of the Supreme Court, the Presidents of
the Supreme Court’s five chambers, and the most senior and most junior magistrates
of each chamber), available at http://www.igsap.map.es/cia/dispo/lopjL1.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire national territory and consists of five
chambers. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 81. These five chambers include civil,
criminal, administrative, social, and military. Id.
70. L.O.P.P. art. 11.3.
71. See id. (providing that a complaint will be inadmissible in three
circumstances: if an unauthorized party submits the complaint, if it fails to comply
with the procedural or substantive requisites for admission, or if it is manifestly
unsubstantiated).
72. Id. art. 11.4. In the event that the court dismisses a complaint, charges may
be refiled only upon the discovery of new evidence not contained in the original
complaint. Id. art. 11.7.
73. Id. art. 7; see also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 100. The protective
appeal is an appellate procedure that safeguards the fundamental rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution and exists as the last domestic appeal
available to a Spanish citizen. Id. at 101. According to Merino-Blanco, this type of
appeal
is only justified when judicial intervention has proved inefficient, because
the object of the recurso de amparo [protective appeal] is protection against
any act of public power which violates any of the following rights: article 14
CE (principle of non-discrimination), articles 15-19 CE (fundamental rights
and public freedoms) and article 30(2) CE (right to military objection).
Id.
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The Spanish legislature offered three fundamental justifications for
75
the law’s passage. First, in noting that nearly twenty-five years have
transpired since Spain’s transition to democracy, the legislature
stated that the law seeks to reflect the experience and institutional
76
evolution that has occurred during that period. The law further
seeks to “renovate” certain norms anchored in antiquated legislative
and judicial priorities that have subsequently proven insufficient and
77
inadequate in confronting the realities of the present. Finally, the
authors of the law sought to fill a perceived legislative void by
articulating concrete constitutional requisites for the organization
78
and activities of political parties in a democracy.
The new law consists of four chapters, the most salient reforms of
79
which appear in Chapter Two.
This chapter governs the
organization, functioning, and activities of parties and requires that

74. L.O.P.P. art. 11.7. The Constitutional Court is an autonomous entity and
does not fall within the ambit of the judicial branch: it is subject only to relevant
provisions of the Constitution and other laws that created it. MERINO-BLANCO, supra
note 58, at 95. The Constitutional Court exists as a mechanism for controlling acts of
the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power, and its primary function is the
interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 97. As an autonomous entity, the court also
has the authority to evaluate the constitutionality of actions of the Executive and the
Judiciary. VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 129. The court is composed of twelve members;
the Congress chooses four members, the Senate four, the Executive two, and the
Consejo General del Poder Judicial [General Council of the Judiciary Branch] chooses
the remaining two. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 97. Members are generally
lawyers, judges, civil servants or university professors, all of whom practice in the
legal field and have more than fifteen years of experience and “recognized
professional standing.” Id. This Court also holds the power to review the actions of
the Executive and the Judiciary for consonance with the Constitution as provided for
in the protective appeal. Id.
75. L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement.
76. See id. § I (reasoning that since Spain’s return to democracy, the protagonism
and constitutional significance of political parties in Spain has increased significantly
and that modern legislation should reflect such evolution).
77. See id. (considering the trend of legislative modernization that has
accompanied the growth of other institutional actors, such as political foundations
and associations).
78. See id. (noting the failure of previous legislation to clearly and explicitly
prescribe the duties and obligations that the constitution imposes on political
parties).
79. The first chapter provides for the creation of political parties and sets forth
the requirements governing their registration with the Ministry of the Interior.
L.O.P.P. arts. 1-5. The second chapter regulates the organization, function, and
activities of political parties. Id. arts. 6-9. Article 6 of this chapter provides that
parties must conform their organization, functions, and, activities to the principles of
democracy, the Constitution, and to all relevant law. Id. art. 6. Article 9 sets forth, in
detail, the activities that can result in proscription. Id. art. 9. Chapter Three
regulates the dissolution of political parties including the procedure and effects
related thereto. Id. arts. 10-12. The fourth chapter governs the financing of political
parties. Id. art. 13.
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their activities be democratic and consonant with the Constitution
80
and all relevant legislation.
The heart of the legislation appears in Article 9 of Chapter Two,
which governs the actions of political organizations and enumerates
81
those activities that may result in proscription.
It provides, in
pertinent part, that political parties are obliged to respect
constitutional values and that a party may be declared illegal if its
82
activities jeopardize established principles of democracy.
More
specifically, the law provides for proscription when any such party
seeks, in a “recurring and egregious manner,” to erode or destroy
fundamental freedoms by engaging in any of an exhaustive list of
83
proscribed activities.
Article 10 provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of a special panel
84
of the Supreme Court and Article 11 outlines the procedure by
85
which a political party may be declared illegal. Finally, Article 12
86
articulates the substantive and practical effects of such a dissolution.
2.

Garzón’s order: The suspension of Batasuna
Judge Garzón’s extensive order cited a multitude of justifications
for the suspension and was no doubt the product of the unrelenting
terrorist campaign that E.T.A. has waged on Spanish society
87
However, Batasuna’s temporary
throughout the last forty years.
suspension came in the wake of an E.T.A. attack that claimed that
80. L.O.P.P. arts. 6-9.
81. Id. art. 9.
82. Id.
83. Article 9 expressly states that the court may declare a political party illegal if it
engages in any of the following:
a) Systematic affronts to fundamental rights and freedoms by fomenting,
justifying, or excusing affronts to the life or integrity of the citizenry or the
exclusion or persecution of an individual based on his ideology, religion,
nationality, race, sex, or sexual orientation.
b) Fomenting, providing, or legitimizing violence as a means of reaching
political objectives or of preventing the exercise of democracy, pluralism,
and political freedom.
c) Politically assisting or supporting the actions of terrorist organizations in
order to subvert the existing constitutional order or egregiously affecting
public order for the purpose of subjecting public officials, particular
individuals, or the population in general, to a climate of terror.
Id. art. 9.2(a)-(c).
84. See L.O.P.P. art. 10 (vesting the power of proscription in a special panel of
the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 61 of the Ley Organica del Poder Judicial
[Organic Law of the Judiciary]).
85. L.O.P.P. art. 11.
86. See L.O.P.P. art. 12 (including such measures as the closure of party
establishments and the transfer of assets to the Treasury).
87. See generally ORDER, supra note 8 (tracing E.T.A.’s history of violence and the
symbiotic role that H.B.-E.H.-Batasuna has played in that enterprise).

SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

2003]

SPAIN’S PROSCRIPTION OF BATASUNA

11/3/2003 11:47 AM

1547

lives of two people, one of whom was a six-year old girl, at a beach
88
While this tragic event and
resort in the summer of 2002.
Batasuna’s subsequent failure to join in a multi-partisan
condemnation of the attack likely served as catalysts for the
Government’s action, nationalists might argue that Garzón calculated
the timing of his order so as to preclude Batasuna from running in
89
the Basque elections of May 2003. The elimination of Batasuna
from the Basque municipal elections resulted in a substantial increase
90
in electoral support for its rival party, the Basque Nationalist Party.
Pursuant to the Law of Political Parties, a definitive declaration of
91
illegality falls within the exclusive province of the Supreme Court.
However, the Penal Code provides for temporary suspensions in
situations in which an organization is under investigation for alleged
92
93
illicit activity.
Title 21 of the Penal Code, “Crimes Against the

88. See DEMANDA PRESENTADA POR LA FISCALÍA [PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT] 12
(Sept. 2, 2002) (citing Batasuna’s failure to condemn the attack as demonstrative of
its support for the actions of E.T.A.), at http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2002/
08/espana/fiscalia.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
89. See Javier Pérez Royo, El derecho de Batasuna a no condenar [Batasuna’s Right Not
to Condemn], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (Aug. 20, 2002) (criticizing the measure for punishing
silence rather than affirmative acts and raising doubt as to the constitutionality of the
Law of Political Parties), available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html (on file with
the American University Law Review). Also of note in considering the impetus for
the dissolution is the fact that the Basque Country will hold elections in May. Given
that the proscription process is one that requires the intervention of various
governmental and judicial entities, Garzón could conceivably have timed his
suspension to afford sufficient time in which to achieve Batasuna’s definitive
proscription before the May elections. See Jane Walker, Beating Batasuna, GUARDIAN
(London) (Aug. 27, 2002) (stating that rival parties had hoped for Batasuna’s
proscription as the party controlled sixty-two town councils and held seven
parliamentary seats), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/
0,2763,781175,00.html (on file with the American University Law Review); El
Tribunal Supremo da un plazo de 20 días a Batasuna para que presente sus alegaciones [The
Supreme Court Gives Batasuna a Period of Twenty Days to Present Their Arguments], EL
MUNDO (Madrid), Feb. 15, 2003 (stating that as of February 14, 2003, Batasuna will
have twenty days to submit allegations and evidence regarding its proscription),
available at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/02/14/espana/1045230214.
html (on file with the American University Law Review). At the conclusion of those
twenty days, the Supreme Court will then have an additional twenty days to issue its
ruling. Id.
90. See El PNV consigue un importante incremento en el País Vasco [The P.N.V. Gains
Important Momentum in the Basque Country], EL MUNDO (Madrid), (May 26, 2003)
(noting that the P.N.V. saw substantial electoral gains in the Basque municipalities of
Bilbao, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Álava), available at http://www.elmundo.es/
elmundo/2003/05/25/enespecial/1053890378.html (on file with the American
University Law Review).
91. L.O.P.P. art. 11 (establishing that the Supreme Court Special Panel is the
only entity empowered to affect the permanent dissolution of a party).
92. See CÓDIGO PENAL (“C.P.”) arts. 129 & 520 (Spain) (providing for temporary
measure of suspension and its corollary effects).
93. Id.; see ORDER, supra note 8, at 324 (further grounding Garzón’s
precautionary measure in relevant provisions of the Penal Code).
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Constitution,” confers upon the judiciary the authority to adopt such
94
Those measures serve to prevent the
precautionary measures.
continuation of the allegedly illicit activity and its deleterious effects
95
during the period of investigation.
Batasuna is currently under
investigation for alleged complicity with a terrorist organization, a
96
Pursuant to the
crime expressly proscribed in the Penal Code.
Penal Code, Judge Garzón’s order provided for a three-year
suspension (renewable up to five years) of Batasuna’s political
activities and the closure of its headquarters, offices, and all other
97
locations that the organization or its members occupied.
In
accordance with Article 23 of the Constitution, the order allowed
Batasuna’s elected members to continue in their individual
98
parliamentary capacities. The temporary nature of the order was
intended to afford the court sufficient time in which to conduct an
99
investigation regarding the party’s alleged criminal links to E.T.A.
Judge Garzón’s order prohibited all public, private, and
institutional activities and disbanded all public organizations, banks,
notaries, foundations, associations, societies, and other entities
100
related to Batasuna. It also contained a provision requiring the
94. See C.P. art. 129.1 (providing for the imposition of various sanctions
including the temporary dissolution of the association, suspension of its activities,
and the closure of its offices, businesses or other establishments during the
provisional period). The National Court, by virtue of the crimes alleged, has
jurisdiction over the present case. This court is a collegiate tribunal located in
Madrid and has jurisdiction over administrative, criminal, and labor matters
throughout the nation. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 86 (noting that this
court has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving, for example, offenses against the
state, drug trafficking, financial crimes, terrorism, and extradition of prisoners).
95. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 323 (confirming that the purpose of the
temporary suspension is to prevent the continuation of criminal activity and its
effects); see also C.P. art. 129.3 (enumerating the precautionary measures at the
tribunal’s disposition).
96. See C.P. art. 515.2 (providing for the proscription and dissolution of terrorist
organizations); id. art. 516.2 (prescribing six to twelve years of incarceration and a six
to fourteen year exclusion from public office as sanctions for participation in a
terrorist organization); see also ORDER, supra note 8, at 343 (basing the order on a
theory of Batasuna’s inextricable links with E.T.A.’s terrorist enterprise). In his
order, Judge Garzón proceeds on the theory that Batasuna-E.H.-H.B. is not merely a
political and ideological ally of E.T.A. but rather that it actually forms part of the
same terrorist machinery. Id. at 323. Judge Garzón states that “a terrorist is not only
he who perpetrates terrorist acts, but also he who incites, directs, subsidizes and gives
life to the organizational complex, constructing a common edifice that gives life to
the group.” Id. at 318.
97. ORDER, supra note 8, at 343-48.
98. Id. Article 23 of the Constitution protects the equal access of all citizens to
participate in elections either as a candidate or as a voter. C.E. art. 23.
99. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 331 (identifying the purpose of the temporary
measure as precluding the continuation of criminal activity and its effects in the case
of illicit terrorist association during the period of investigation).
100. See id. at 344 (providing for such endeavors undertaken in the names of H.B.
and E.H. or under any other name that the group should choose to adopt).

SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

2003]

SPAIN’S PROSCRIPTION OF BATASUNA

11/3/2003 11:47 AM

1549

Ertzaintza (Basque autonomous police force) to identify and close all
centers of Batasuna activity not included explicitly in Parts I and II of
101
102
the Order. The Order suspended all financial aid to Batasuna. It
also suspended water, electricity, and telephone services, prohibited
103
the party from conducting any financial business. Finally, the order
prohibited Batasuna from organizing demonstrations, marches, or
rallies and proscribed the use of any form of propaganda including
104
the display of symbols associated with the group. Finally, the Order
required Batasuna to terminate any web page or electronic service
105
that it operated on the Internet.
3.

Supreme and Constitutional Court decisions: A definitive proscription
On September 2, 2002, pursuant to the Law of Political Parties,
both the Public Prosecutor and the Government filed requests for the
106
proscription of Batasuna with the Supreme Court. However, before
that Court could reach a final decision, the Basque Government
called upon the Constitutional Court to rule on an interlocutory
107
appeal challenging the constitutionality of the law itself.
101. See id. at 346 (requiring the closure of all such establishments within four
days of identification).
102. See id. (mandating the freezing of all of Batasuna’s assets and providing a
bank account for the deposit of all such funds).
103. See id. (eliminating Batasuna’s capacity to contract, negotiate, buy stock,
receive loans, and make investments).
104. See id. at 348 (describing the prohibited activities as demonstrations, marches
or rallies as well as the display of any form of propaganda such as signs or symbols
identified with the group).
105. See also Pedro de Alzaga, Los problemas de Garzón en Internet [Garzón’s Internet
Problems], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (Oct. 23, 2002) (noting the difficulties that Garzón
encountered in impeding Internet access to Batasuna sponsored web pages),
available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html (on file with the American University
Law Review). Jurisdictional issues have arisen as the web provider of batasuna.org,
Blueberry Hills Communications, is incorporated and has its place of business in the
United States. Id. The U.S. company originally blocked access to Batasuna’s web
page; however, the company’s legal department later advised that Garzón’s order
could not compel the block. Lawyers concluded that since the provider was a U.S.
company and the organization that contracted the site, La Agrupación Electoral Euskal
Herritarrok [The Basque People’s Electoral Group], maintained its headquarters in
France, the issue fell within the province of international jurisdiction and was not
subject to Judge Garzón’s order. Id.
106. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88; DEMANDA PRESENTADA POR EL
GOBIERNO [GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT] (Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT’S
COMPLAINT], at http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2002/09/demanda.pdf (on
file with the American University Law Review).
107. El Constitucional respalda la Ley de partidos que hará posible la Ilegalización de
Batasuna [The Constitutional Court Upholds the Law of Political Parties Which Will Facilitate
Batasuna’s Proscription], EL MUNDO (Madrid), Mar. 14, 2003 [hereinafter The Court
Upholds the Law of Political Parties] (reporting that the Basque Government filed its
appeal with the Constitutional Court in September 2002), available at
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/ 2003/03/12/espana/1047493966.html (on file
with the American University Law Review). The Basque Government filed a recurso de
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The constitutionality of all legislation in Spain falls within the
province of the Constitutional Court, an autonomous entity
108
Questions of constitutionality
independent of the judicial branch.
reach the court through any one of five different procedural
109
mechanisms, one of which is the protective appeal provided for in
110
This appeal allows an individual to
the Law of Political Parties.
contest the constitutionality of a law that infringes upon a
111
fundamental right as defined in the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court ultimately rejected the Basque
Government’s appeal and upheld the constitutionality of the Law of
112
Political Parties.
The Constitutional Court issued its ruling on
March 13, 2003 allowing the Supreme Court to continue its
113
consideration of Batasuna’s proscription.
Two weeks later, on
March 27, 2003, the Supreme Court issued its decision resulting in
114
the party’s definitive proscription. This ruling rendered permanent
inconstitucionalidad [appeal of unconstitutionality] which serves to challenge any
rules that carry “force of law.” Id. See also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 55, at 98
(explaining the procedural mechanisms that govern the use of the “appeal of
unconstitutionality”).
108. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 95 (noting that the Constitutional
Court exists as its own jurisdiction and its decisions are based solely on the text of the
Constitution); VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 129 (explaining that the Constitutional
Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of the executive and the judiciary and also
exists to protect the fundamental rights enshrined in the 1978 Constitution).
109. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 98-104 (enumerating and describing
the various mechanisms for challenging the constitutionality of legislative, executive,
and judicial actions). For instance, the recurso de inconstitucionalidad [appeal of
unconstitutionality] allows the Court to review the constitutionality of any rule that
carries the force of law. Id. at 98. The only parties with standing to initiate such an
appeal are the members of the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, the President, the
Ombudsman, the Governments of the Autonomous Communities, and the
Legislative Assemblies of the Communities. Id. at 99.
The cuestión de
inconstitucionalidad [question of unconstitutionality] is essentially an interlocutory
appeal of a law’s constitutionality. Id. at 100. Any party to a judicial proceeding or
the judge himself may initiate this appeal. Id. at 101. In the case of the conflicto de
compentencia [conflicts of law], the Constitutional Court may rule on the distribution
of powers as between the central State and the Autonomous Communities upon
disagreement regarding which of the two has jurisdiction to decide the question at
issue. Id. at 103. Finally, the Constitutional Court may also hear issues of conflictos de
atribuciones [conflicts of attributions] which arise when there is some dispute with
regard to separation of powers. Id. at 104. Such a proceeding is actionable only at
the behest of the Executive, the Congress, the Senate or the General Council of the
Judiciary. Id.
110. See supra note 73 (describing the relevance of the protective appeal).
111. See VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 25 (identifying the fundamental rights subject
to the protective appeal as those included in Articles 14 through 29 of the
Constitution); see also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 102-03 (stating that the court
will nullify the contested legislation if it finds the law unconstitutional).
112. S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003), available at http://www.
tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
113. Id.
114. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13. The judgment also bans
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the effects of Judge Garzón’s order and relied on much of the same
115
reasoning.
After studying the evidence adduced by the Government, the
Public Prosecutor, and Batasuna, the Supreme Court concluded that
the party functioned as an extension and under the influence of
116
E.T.A. In so concluding, the Supreme Court relied in large part on
Batasuna’s violation of various provisions of Article 9 of the Law of
Political Parties. This Article enumerates the actions which, when
committed in a recurring and egregious manner, will result in
proscription. Such activities include systematically jeopardizing
117
fundamental rights
and fomenting, providing, or legitimizing
118
It also proscribes
violence as a means of achieving political ends.
complementing or supporting a terrorist organization so as to subvert
the constitutional order and disrupting public order by subjecting
public officials, particular individuals, or the population in general to
119
a climate of terror.
A party may violate these provisions through
the commission of any one of a number of proscribed activities
120
including: “providing express or tacit support for terrorism,”
“accompanying violent action with programs or behavior designed to
foment an atmosphere of civil confrontation or to deprive others of
basic liberties (opinion and participation in public affairs) by way of
121
coercion, intimidation, etc.,” and finally, “the regular inclusion of
persons convicted of terrorist crimes in the party’s directorate or on
122
its electoral ballots.”
The Supreme Court lent significant weight to evidence
demonstrating Batasuna’s legitimization of violence through express
and tacit political support for the actions of terrorists in pursuit of
123
political ends.
The Supreme Court’s application of this provision
Batasuna’s predecessor parties, H.B. and E.H. Id. at 197.
115. Garzón derived his authority to suspend the party from the Penal Code,
which provides only for temporary suspensions for investigatory purposes whereas
the Law of Political Parties vests in the Supreme Court the exclusive power to issue a
definitive proscription. C.P. art. 129 (allowing for the temporary suspension of
allegedly illicit associations); L.O.P.P. art. 11 (reserving the power of proscription for
the Supreme Court).
116. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 18-19.
117. L.O.P.P art. 9.2(a).
118. Id. art. 9.2(b).
119. Id. art. 9.2(c).
120. Id. art. 9.3(a).
121. Id. art. 9.3(b).
122. Id. art. 9.3(c). The law goes on to provide for six other activities that come
within the scope of Article 9 proscriptions. Id. art. 9.3(d)-(i). As the court’s opinion
focuses primarily on the first three activities, this Comment confines its analysis to
those provisions.
123. Id. art. 9.2(b) & 9.3(a).
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closely reflects the analysis of political support for violence that the
E.C.H.R. conducts in assessing the existence of a “pressing social
124
This analysis relies
need” for the proscription of a political party.
heavily on the public statements of party leaders evidencing the
party’s acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of achieving its
125
political objective.
In further applying the standards established in the Law of Political
Parties, the Court cited the degree of symbiosis that exists between
E.T.A. and its political wing. It noted, in particular, that various
convicted members of E.T.A. occupy the highest echelons of the
126
Batasuna directorate.
For example, in 1989, the National Court
convicted Batasuna’s spokesman, Arnaldo Otegi of kidnapping and
127
sentenced him to six years in prison.
Another Batasuna
parliamentarian, once a candidate for the presidency of the Basque
Parliament, was convicted for crimes of terrorism in France on
February 26, 1990 and is currently wanted for involvement in a car
128
bombing, with an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The Supreme
Court also noted that currently, four of Batasuna’s seven
representatives in the Basque Parliament have been convicted of
129
crimes of terrorism.
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
On March 12, 2003, Spain’s Constitutional Court issued a ruling
130
that upheld the constitutionality of the Law of Political Parties
124. See, e.g., Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 89
(2002) (holding that while the party employed legitimate means in pursuing its
political objectives, its allusions to the possibility of the recourse to violence were
sufficiently flagrant so as to justify its loss of society’s tolerance); Socialist Party v.
Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 71 (1998) (examining various
statements of party leaders and concluding that they failed to demonstrate the
acceptance of violence as a legitimate political method); United Communist Party v.
Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1998) (considering Communist party leaders’
statements calling for a Kurdish nation in holding that those remarks failed to justify
restrictions on the freedom of association); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533,
2567 (1997) (considering the remarks of a politician expressing support for a
terrorist organization in determining the legitimacy of restrictions placed on his
freedom of expression).
125. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 75-79 (quoting various
Batasuna members in demonstrating the party’s constructive support for E.T.A’s
terrorist campaign); see also infra note 193 (examining the statements of various
Batasuna representatives extolling the use of violence in pursuit of Basque
independence).
126. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 18.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003), available at http://www.
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leaving the E.C.H.R. as the final forum in which to challenge
131
Accordingly, on September 9, 2003, the
Batasuna’s proscription.
Basque Autonomous Government announced its intention to appeal
132
the Constitutional Court’s ruling before the E.C.H.R. The Basque
Government contends that Batasuna’s proscription constitutes a
133
134
135
136
violation of Articles 6, 7, and 11 of the European Convention.
The European Convention on Human Rights exists as an
international, extra-constitutional guarantor of certain fundamental
rights and its tribunal, the E.C.H.R., serves as a supplementary forum
in which parties, unsuccessful in domestic courts, may seek redress
137
for alleged human rights violations.
Articles 26 and 27 of the
Convention set forth the admissibility conditions with which all
tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
131. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining E.C.H.R. requisites for
the appeal of domestic judicial rulings).
132. Batasuna’s Defense, supra note 16 (noting that the Constitutional Court
decided by unanimous vote to uphold the law).
133. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 6 (enshrining the right to a fair and public trial).
134. Id. art. 7. Article 7 reads in pertinent part:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal
offense was committed.
Id.
135. Id. art. 11. Article 11 reads as follows:
Article 11 - Freedom of Assembly and Association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, . . .
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of
these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.
Id.
136. SERVICIO ANALÍTICO-INFORMATIVO DE LA RED VASCA ROJA, LA “DEMOCRACIA”
ESPAÑOLA JIBARIZADA: LA “HISTÓRICA” SESIÓN DEL ESPAÑOL CONGRESO DE LOS
DIPUTADOS QUE ACTIVÓ LA INCONSTITUCIONAL LEY DE PARTIDOS PARA ILEGALIZAR A
BATASUNA [ANALYTICAL-INFORMATIVE SERVICE OF THE RED BASQUE NET, SPANISH
DEMOCRACY “JIBARIZADA”: THE “HISTORIC” SESSION OF THE SPANISH CONGRESS OF
DEPUTIES THAT PROMULGATED THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO BAN BATASUNA]
[hereinafter SPANISH DEMOCRACY] (examining ways in which the Law of Political
Parties violates the rights of expression and association protected by the Spanish
Constitution), at http://www.basque-red.net/cas/oculto/ejemplo/ag2002/ag028.
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
This Comment confines its analysis to the law’s conformity with Article 11 as it relates
to the freedom of association and political proscription.
137. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 101 (explaining the system of appeals
and stating that individuals may appeal determinations of constitutionality affecting
fundamental rights before the E.C.H.R.).
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claims must comply. The most salient provision states that in order
for the E.C.H.R. to consider a complaint, the complaining party must
139
have exhausted all domestic remedies and must have submitted the
application within six months from the date of the issuance of the
140
national decision. As the Law of Political Parties provides only for
protective appeal before the Constitutional Court, that court’s recent
decision upholding the constitutionality of the law represents an
141
exhaustion of local remedies.
Consequently, the E.C.H.R.
represents the final forum in which to challenge the proscription of
142
Batasuna.
A. Domestic Applicability of the European Convention
Pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation, all international treaties
to which Spain is a signatory, upon ratification, automatically form
143
part of domestic law.
Spain subscribes to the monist school of
incorporation, which provides for automatic incorporation of
international rules with no further legislative action necessary to
144
confer binding authority upon an international agreement.
The
145
Spanish Constitution identifies three distinct varieties of treaties.
Among those, Article 93 treaties confer some of the powers of the
146
State upon an international organization. In order to assume force
of law, such treaties require the passage of a Ley Orgánica [Organic

138. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining the process by which
claims arrive at the E.C.H.R.).
139. Eur. Conv. on H.R. arts. 26 & 27; see VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at
89 (defining exhaustion of domestic remedies as the employment of all “remedies
provided for up to the highest level only if and in so far as the appeal to a higher
tribunal can still substantially affect the decision on the merits”).
140. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 26; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 98.
141. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 101-02 (stating that the protective
appeal is the last internal appeal available to a citizen contesting the alleged
infringement upon a fundamental right or freedom).
142. See id. (explaining the system of appeals and stating that individuals may
appeal determinations of constitutionality affecting fundamental rights before the
E.C.H.R.).
143. Id. at 33 (noting that Article 96 of the Spanish Constitution expressly
provides for the incorporation of valid treaties into the domestic legal system).
144. Id. The monist system, largely favored in Continental tradition, is in
juxtaposition with the dualist system employed in England. Id. at 33 n.27. The
dualist system necessitates legislative action in order to confer binding authority
upon international treaties. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 11-12.
145. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33 (describing the three types of
treaties as: Article 93 treaties which give some state power to an international
organization; treaties that require prior authorization by Parliament; and finally, any
other treaty that does not fall into the previously described categories).
146. C.E. art. 93; MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33.
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147

Law] authorizing their signature.
The Treaty of the Accession of
148
149
Spain to the European Union is exemplary of such a treaty.
Upon the passage of the requisite Organic Law, any subsequent
legislation that the European Union passes becomes binding in Spain
150
without any action on the part of domestic institutions.
The
Supreme Court of Spain has confirmed that “European Community
Law has direct effect and supremacy over national law by virtue of the
partial cession of sovereignty brought about by the accession to the
151
European Community.”
Similarly, the Constitutional Court has
stated that “the binding force of Community Law emanates from the
Accession Treaty according to Article 93 of the Spanish
152
Constitution.” Consequently, the European Convention on Human
Rights, to which Spain is a signatory, carries with it the force of
domestic law and accordingly governs all domestic legislative and
judicial pronouncements.
B. E.C.H.R. Jurisprudence Regarding Political Proscription and the
Freedom of Association
The E.C.H.R. has had frequent occasion to consider the issue of
political proscription. Both the case of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v.
153
154
Turkey and the case of Socialist Party v. Turkey, in addition to other
recent decisions, exemplify recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence regarding
the proscription of political parties. Those decisions provide a useful
paradigm through which to examine and evaluate the potential fate
155
of the ban on Batasuna.
In interpreting Article 11, specifically in the context of political
proscription, the E.C.H.R. has established a tripartite test that
governs its analysis.
The E.C.H.R.’s Article 11 jurisprudence
establishes that, in order to comply with the Convention, restrictions
147. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33.
148. Id. at 34.
149. See id. (citing a Constitutional Court decision which provided that “the
binding force of Community Law comes from the Accession Treaty according to
Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution”).
150. Id.
151. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 36 (internal quotations omitted).
152. Id. at 34.
153. App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (2002).
154. App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1998).
155. Compare Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 56 (finding no violation of Article
11), with Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 51 (holding that the dissolution of the
Socialist Party violated provisions of Article 11), and United Communist Party v.
Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (1998) (holding that the dissolution of the Communist
Party constituted an Article 11 violation). The Socialist and Communist Party cases
prove particularly instructive in the case of Batasuna as they also address the
dissolution of political parties associated with terrorist separatist organizations.
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on the freedoms of association must be: (1) “prescribed by law,”
(2) directed at one or more “legitimate aims,” and (3) be “necessary
156
in a domestic society” in order to achieve those aims.
The first element, prescription by law, requires that relevant
157
domestic law provide for the dissolution of a political party.
With
regard to the second element, Article 11 enumerates various interests
158
that will satisfy the “legitimate aim” inquiry.
The European Court
regards as legitimate, those actions taken to ensure national security
or public safety, to prevent disorder or crime, and to protect the
159
rights and freedoms of others.
Finally, with regard to the third
element, “necessary in a democratic society,” the E.C.H.R. routinely
160
lends primacy to this factor and has established several general
principles that govern its analysis.
The E.C.H.R. defines “necessary in a democratic society” as those
161
measures that meet a “pressing social need.”
It has expressly
limited its role in such an inquiry to that of determining whether the
relevant national authority has employed a means “‘proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the
162
national authority to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient.’”
In
156. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76 (applying the tripartite test in
holding that the dissolution of the Welfare Party did not violate Article 11); Socialist
Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81 (applying the tripartite test in finding that Turkey’s
dissolution of the Socialist party resulted in a violation of Article 11). In Socialist
Party, the European Court noted that it generally conflates its analyses of Articles 10
and 11 as Article 11 violations must be “considered in light of Article 10 [as] the
protection of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of
the freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in Article 11.” Id. at 83.
157. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76 (concluding that a constitutional
provision or similar statutory provision will constitute a prescription by law); Socialist
Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81 (holding that various articles of both the
Constitution and domestic law satisfied the prescription by law element); United
Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 (holding that statutory and constitutional
provisions satisfied the inquiry as to prescription by law).
158. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 11 (identifying as legitimate aims, the preservation
“of national security or public safety,” “the prevention of disorder or crime,” or “the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”).
159. Id.
160. Id. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 (finding unanimity among the
parties as to the first two criteria and establishing the third element as outcome
determinative); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 (holding that the restriction
failed Article 11 scrutiny due to its failure to satisfy the court’s pressing social need
inquiry); United Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28 (noting that the dissolution of
the Communist party similarly failed to comply with Article 11 due to its
inconsistency with the third prong of the test); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533,
2547 (1997) (finding that interference complied with all three prongs of the Article
10 test).
161. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80 (finding that Turkey’s dissolution of
the Welfare Party met a “pressing social need” in light of the party’s intention of
establishing a plurality of legal systems and its tacit support of political violence).
162. See id. (ruling that the nature and severity of the restriction imposed are
factors in the calculus of proportionality and deeming the measures adopted in Refah
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doing so, the E.C.H.R. must find that national authorities applied a
standard consonant with Article 11 and that “they based their
163
decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.”
Specifically with regard to restrictions on the activities of political
parties, the E.C.H.R. expressly noted that states are not free to place
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of a political party simply
164
because they disagree with its message. The E.C.H.R. has, however,
tempered the scrutiny to which it subjects alleged Article 11 violations
165
with several limitations regarding the activities of political parties.
For example, it explicitly eschewed the employment of any means
166
other than democracy to achieve political ends.
The European
Court elaborated with the admonition that “a political party whose
leaders incite recourse to violence, or propose a policy which does
not comply with [the] rules of democracy . . . cannot lay claim to the
protection of the Convention against penalties imposed for those
167
reasons.” Accordingly, the E.C.H.R. has held that, on occasion, the
exercise of a fundamental right may be subordinated in the interest
of maintaining order and public safety and protecting the
168
fundamental rights of other citizens.
Recognizing the unique difficulties associated with the fight against
terrorism, the E.C.H.R. also takes into account the historical
169
predicate of any case before it.
In one such case, it stated that
Partisi to be both relevant and sufficient).
163. See id. (establishing the general principles that govern the court’s analysis of
alleged Article 11 violations).
164. See United Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27 (holding that there is no
justification for restricting the rights of a political party “solely because it seeks to
debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to take part in the
nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions
capable of satisfying everyone concerned.”).
165. See generally Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 56 (upholding dissolution of
the Welfare Party).
166. Id. at 78. This case articulates the rule regarding political activity such that a
political party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional
basis of the State on two conditions: (1) the means used to that end must in every
respect be legal and democratic; and (2) the change proposed must itself be
compatible with fundamental democratic principles. Id.
167. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78-79 (stating that no person may take
umbrage in provisions of the Convention in order to perform acts aimed at
destroying those same rights and freedoms as they apply to others). Such definitive
prohibitions apply with notable force to the case of Batasuna as its connections to
E.T.A. illustrate the role that it has played in depriving the Spanish population of
fundamental rights that Batasuna now claims that the government has violated. See
infra note 226 (elaborating on the ways in which the Batasuna/E.T.A. alliance has
violated the rights of the Basque citizenry).
168. Id.; see Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15,
2001) (holding that freedom of religion could be restricted in the interest of a
neutral public education service).
169. See, e.g., United Communist Party v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 26-27 (1998)
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political freedoms are not absolute and that “in a democratic society,
it is of cardinal importance for the authorities to fulfill their duties to
170
wage a relentless and unremitting battle against terrorism.”
171
The applicant in Refah Partisi was a political party properly
172
Following the 1995 elections, it
registered under Turkish law.
(considering the climate of internal discord that characterized the nationalist
struggle between the Turks and the Kurds). In a similar vein, in Refah Partisi, the
Court considered the role and the history of political proscription in Western
European nations and examined the notion of “militant democracy.” See 35 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 83 (examining the evolution of political proscription and its role in the
constitutional development of Western totalitarian states). The concept of a militant
democracy was borne of the experiences of Germany and Italy in their struggles with
fascism and national-socialism, movements which came to power after free elections.
See id. (defining a militant democracy as “a democratic system which defended itself
against all political movements which sought to destroy it”). Such a notion finds
particular resonance in the case of Spain, which likewise freed itself from the yoke of
fascism upon the death of Franco in 1975. See JIMÉNEZ, supra note 14, at 386 (noting
the precarious political situation that characterized the period between the death of
Franco and the eventual achievement of democratic stability). In response to these
new threats, “the concept of militant democracy and the possibility of repressing
political groups which abused the freedoms of association and expression were set
forth in the Constitutions of European States,” illustrating that many Western
democracies not only accept the practice but recognize it as an invaluable means of
combating the threats that radical political factions pose to democracy. See Ami
Pedahzur, Struggling Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within
Democratic Boundaries: A Comparative Analysis 20 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the American University Law Review) (contextualizing the
employment of political proscription as a response to the abuse of newly conferred
freedoms by radical parties in post-dictatorship periods), available at
http://www.essex.ac.uk; see also John Finn, Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of AntiDemocratic Parties, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 70-74
(David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2001) (indicating that Australia,
Chile, France, Germany, Israel, and Italy, among others, have either constitutional or
legislative provisions that allow for the proscription of political parties). Finn also
notes that the European Convention explicitly provides for such proscriptions. Id. at
71. The European Parliament also affirmed this practice in its resolution of
December 10, 1996 on the constitutional status of European political parties.
According to the resolution, the program and activities of political parties must
respect democracy, human rights, and the fundamental constitutional principles of
the rule of law enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union. Refah Partisi, 35 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 74.
170. Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2548 (1997). The Commission stated
in its opinion:
[W]here in such a society, political violence is a permanent threat to the life
and safety of the population, and where support for that violence is
expressed through the media, it is imperative to strike a fair balance between
the right to freedom of expression and the legitimate right of the
community to protect itself against the activities of armed groups whose
avowed or concealed aim is to overthrow the democratic system which is the
guarantee of human rights.
Id. at 2568. This statement, in the context of an alleged violation of Article 10
assumes importance in the instant case as the court has stated that Article 11
violations must be considered in light of the provisions contained in Article 10. See
supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the joint application of Articles 10
and 11).
171. App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (2002).
172. See id. at 63 (noting that the party was founded in July 18, 1983).
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existed as the largest political party in the Turkish parliament.
In
May of 1997, the Principal State Counsel applied to the Turkish
Constitutional Court to dissolve the Welfare Party on the grounds
that its activities and central tenets contravened principles of
174
secularism.
The Constitutional Court, in holding that activities incompatible
with the rule of law were impermissible, cited various provisions of
domestic legislation obliging political parties to abide by the
175
principle of secularism.
Of special significance in the
Constitutional Court’s analysis was Turkey’s experience with religious
discord and the fact that secularism was consequently enshrined in
176
the Constitution as a pillar of the Turkish State. The Constitutional
Court ultimately found that the government’s actions to maintain a
177
secular state were required to preserve the principles of democracy.
The Turkish Court ordered the immediate and permanent
dissolution of the Welfare Party, transferred its assets to the State
Treasury, and banned five of its Members of Parliament from
178
participating in any political party for five years.
The applicants subsequently appealed the Constitutional Court’s
ruling before the E.C.H.R. They alleged that the order dissolving the
Welfare Party and prohibiting its leaders from holding office in that
party or in any other political party constituted an interference with
their right to freedom of association in violation of Article 11 of the
179
European Convention of Human Rights.
173. See id. (claiming 158 of the 450 total seats in the Turkish parliament following
the 1995 election).
174. See id. (noting that the application reflected that the Welfare Party’s leaders
promoted the concept of jihad in advocating for the abolition of secularism in
Turkey).
175. See id. at 66 (stating that the Constitutional Court based its ruling on Turkish
Law No. 2820 on regulation of political parties). The domestic law provides for the
dissolution of political parties that “jeopardize the existence of the Turkish State and
Republic, abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, [or] introduce discrimination
on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a religious
sect . . . .” Id. at 74. The law vests authority in the Constitutional Court to dissolve a
party if it finds that it is operating contrary to the above provision. Id. at 75.
176. Id. at 67.
177. See id. at 83 (resting its decision largely on remarks of Welfare Party leaders
indicating that the party “had an actively aggressive and belligerent attitude to the
established order’ and was making ‘a concerted attempt to prevent it from
functioning properly”) (internal quotations omitted). The Government had argued
that such speeches existed as calls for popular insurgency in order to bring about the
demise of the existing political order and thus the dissolution of the Welfare Party
served the “pressing need” of the preservation of democracy. Id. at 83-84.
178. See id. at 72 (concluding that the offending Members of Parliament were
responsible for the Welfare Party’s dissolution by virtue of the radical threat to
democracy that they posed as evidenced in various statements and speeches).
179. See id. at 81 (refuting the government’s claim that the Welfare Party militated
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The E.C.H.R., applying its tripartite test, agreed with the
180
With regard to
Constitutional Court and upheld the dissolution.
the first criterion, all parties stipulated that the dissolution was
prescribed by law as both the Turkish Constitution and Law 2820 on
181
the regulation of political parties provided for proscription.
The
E.C.H.R. further held that, in preserving secularism, the Welfare
Party’s dissolution served the interests of protecting national security,
182
public safety, and the rights and freedoms of others.
Finally, the E.C.H.R. held that the party’s proscription was
necessary in a democratic society and hinged its ruling on three
grounds for dissolution: the Welfare Party’s advocation of a
183
pluralistic legal system, its intent to institute the law of sharia, and
finally, remarks of party members advocating jihad as a legitimate
184
political method. The E.C.H.R. based its ruling largely on the facts
that the Welfare Party declared its intention of setting up a plurality
of legal systems and had “adopted an ambiguous stance with regard
185
to the use of force to gain power and retain it.” In concluding that
the dissolution did not violate Article 11 of the European
Convention, the E.C.H.R. declared that, “a State may reasonably
forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with
the Convention’s provisions, before an attempt is made to implement
it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the
186
country’s democratic regime.”
The E.C.H.R. upheld the first justification for dissolution, stating
that a plurality of legal systems in the same nation would be
187
inconsistent with the Convention system.
It explained that such a
model would not only preclude the State from exercising its role as a
“guarantor of individual rights and freedoms,” but would also result
for the abandonment or destruction of existing Turkish constitutional order and
asserting that the government had violated freedom of expression in barring
parliament members from political participation).
180. See id. at 76-77 (requiring that the dissolution of a political party be
“prescribed by law,” executed in pursuit of a “legitimate aim,” and “necessary in a
democratic society”).
181. See id. at 76 (establishing that a constitutional provision permitting the
dissolution of a political party will satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement).
182. See id. at 76-78 (concluding, in agreement with the Constitutional Court, that
the preservation of secularism was necessary in order to protect national security,
public safety, the rights and freedoms of others, and to prevent disorder or crime).
183. See id. at 86 (defining sharia as Islamic law).
184. See id. at 84 (dividing all arguments put forward by the Principal State
Counsel and those the Constitutional Court cited into three categories).
185. Id. at 91.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 85-86 (noting that the State bears the obligation of procuring and
applying laws uniformly with regard to all citizens).
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in an inherently unequal legal treatment of individuals.
The
E.C.H.R. noted that the creation of a pluralistic legal system based on
religion would import a disparity in the treatment, legal and
189
otherwise, of Turkish citizens according to their religions.
The final and most compelling consideration in the E.C.H.R.’s
190
analysis is characteristic of all of its Article 11 jurisprudence. In all
of these cases, the E.C.H.R. lent significance to the party’s tacit
support for violence as a political method as evidenced in the
191
remarks of its members and directorate.
For example, in Refah Partisi, the E.C.H.R. upheld proscription of
192
the Welfare Party, and in Zana, it affirmed the conviction of a
political leader for statements that he made in support of a separatist
terrorist organization. In both cases the E.C.H.R. took special notice
of remarks in which party leaders espoused the use of force as a
means by which to reach political ends. It also lent probative weight
to the fact that those leaders failed to take affirmative steps to
distance themselves from the factions within their parties that had
extolled the virtue of armed struggle against politicians who opposed
193
them.
188. See id. (condemning the creation of a pluralistic legal system as incompatible
with the European Convention). It is worth noting that the lehendakari [president] of
the Basque Country presented a plan for shared sovereignty over the autonomous
community. Ibarretxe plantea una soberanía compartida entre País Vasco y España
[Ibarretexe Proposes a Shared Sovereignty Between the Basque Country and Spain], ABC
(Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.abc.es/Nacional/noticia.asp?id=
132180&dia=hoy (reporting that Ibarretxe also suggested that the Basque Country
should enjoy direct participation in European institutions).
The European
Commission unanimously rejected the plan as incompatible with the existing
framework of the European Union. See Ibarretxe’s Plan, supra note 34 (declaring that
there is no judicial basis for Ibarretxe’s initiative).
189. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 85-86
(2002) (warning that such distinctions would undermine legislative and judicial
unity).
190. See id. at 89 (noting that while the party employed legitimate means in
pursuing its political objectives, its allusions to the possibility of the recourse to
violence were sufficiently flagrant so as to justify its loss of society’s tolerance);
Socialist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 71 (1998)
(examining the statements of party leaders that allegedly reflected their acceptance
of violence as a legitimate political method); United Communist Party v. Turkey, 62
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1998) (considering Communist party leaders’ statements calling
for a Kurdish nation in holding that those remarks failed to justify restrictions on the
freedom of association); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2567 (1997)
(considering the remarks of a politician expressing support for a terrorist
organization in determining whether restricting his freedom of expression met a
“pressing social need”).
191. See infra note 193 (exploring the role of public statements in the Court’s
evaluation of the existence of a pressing social need).
192. 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2534, 2549 (regarding the comments that the leader made
in support of the PKK as likely to exacerbate an “explosive situation” and concluding
that the interference with the freedom of expression served a “pressing social need”).
193. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 83 (noting that the Turkish
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The E.C.H.R. cited statements of various party members as support
for its findings regarding proscription and a pressing social need. In
Constitutional Court identified speeches made by Welfare Party leaders
demonstrating “an actively aggressive and belligerent attitude to the established
order” and making “a concerted attempt to prevent it from functioning properly” as
grounds for dissolution); see also Zana, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2567 (stating that in
describing acts of terrorism as a “national liberation struggle,” the applicant not only
failed to dissociate himself from such acts, but implicitly justified them).
In Refah Partisi, the Constitutional Court found that the offending speeches
constituted a call for public uprising and the use of force, that the proscription of the
party represented a preventative measure for the protection of democracy which, for
the purposes of the E.C.H.R.’s analysis, constituted a “pressing social need.” 35 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 83. In its analysis, the Court gave special consideration to remarks of
several Welfare Party Members of Parliament. Id. at 88. “We shall certainly call to
account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who
deprive Allah’s messenger of his jurisdiction in their country.” Id. at 69. The court
quoted one Member of Parliament as proclaiming, “Our homeland belongs to us,
but not the regime.” Id. at 70. Another member avowed, “[i]f you attempt to close
down the . . . theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood
will flow . . . . That’s how democracy will be installed.” Id. at 71.
While the court conceded that government documents contained no explicit calls
for the use of force, it lent probative weight to the failure of Welfare Party leaders to
take “prompt practical steps to distance themselves from” the factions within the
party who had made such calls for violent insurgency. Id. at 88. See Zana, 57 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 2549 (finding no violation of Article 10’s freedom of expression where
Turkey imposed criminal sanctions based on the applicant’s statements in support of
a separatist organization). The court again lent compelling weight to the conclusion
of the Commission in its finding that, in failing to dissociate himself from acts of
terrorism, the applicant had implicitly justified and propagated them. Id. In this
case, the Court also noted the relevance of the fact that the applicant made the
remarks on the same day that PKK militants killed a number of civilians resulting in
an atmosphere of “extreme tension.” Id.
Similarly, the Spanish Government pointed out that Batasuna was the only political
party that failed to sign on to a multi-lateral condemnation of recent E.T.A. attacks
that resulted in the deaths of a six-year-old girl and a fifty-seven-year-old man at a
popular beach resort in Santa Pola, Alicante. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note
88, at 12. Not only did Batasuna fail to condemn the terrorist attack but one of its
representatives, Antton Morcillo, affirmed that the failure to condemn acts of E.T.A.
was a sign of Batasuna’s political identity and further that “the events in Santa Pola
are the result of the situation of perpetual conflict that one lives with in Euskal
Herria.” Id. at 14.
The Public Prosecutor’s complaint is replete with similar statements manifesting
Batasuna’s support for E.T.A.’s bloody enterprise. On August 11, 2002, at a rally in
San Sebastian, the Batasuna directorate was involved in cheers supporting E.T.A:
“gora E.T.A. militarra” [long live E.T.A.]. Id. at 16. At the closure of the rally, a
member of Batasuna’s National Cabinet addressed the crowd promising that “if
Aznar wants a war, the abertzale [left] and all of Euskal Herria will respond with war;”
and continued, proclaiming “when all doors to agreement are closed before the
people, it has only one recourse, death or independence. Independence or death is
our mantra.” Id. at 16.
The complaint also contained the transcript of statements that Arnaldo Otegi,
spokesman for Batasuna, delivered at a press conference regarding Garzón’s order.
Id. at 19. It quoted Otegi as saying, “Don’t even think, and we ask this with absolute
humility but with rotundity, about using the mechanisms [referring to the Ertzaintza]
at your disposal, to collaborate with the strategy of annihilating the left [BatasunaE.H.-H.B.], don’t even think about collaboration with the Spanish State’s strategy of
genocide.” Id. at 19. Otegi concluded warning the Basque Government to “disobey
the State [or] assume the consequences.” Id. at 19-20.
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Zana, the E.C.H.R. examined the statements of a political leader in
which he expressed his solidarity with a terrorist organization, the
PKK, at a time that coincided with a deadly attack that resulted in the
194
deaths of various civilians.
It concluded that in such a case, the
penalty imposed could reasonably be regarded as serving a pressing
195
social need.
Also, the European Court in Refah Partisi cited one leader as stating
that “the question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will
be violent or peaceful . . . will it be achieved harmoniously or by
196
bloodshed.”
Another stated that those who opposed the party
would suffer the “calamity [of] the renegades they will have to
197
The E.C.H.R. further noted that the remarks of one of the
face.”
Welfare Party’s parliament members revealed deep hatred for those
198
he considered to be opponents of an Islamist regime.
The court
concluded that “where the offending conduct reaches a high level of
insult and comes close to a negation of the freedom of religion of
199
others it loses the right to society’s tolerance.”
Upon deciding that the dissolution of the Welfare Party met a
pressing social need, the E.C.H.R. addressed the issue of
proportionality, stating that the nature and severity of the
200
interference are also factors to be weighed in its assessment.
In
doing so, it noted that despite the exclusion of five party members
from political activity, the Party’s remaining 152 members of
parliament continued in their parliamentary capacities, and also that
the Welfare Party at no time alleged pecuniary damage based on the
201
transfer of assets to the Treasury.
The E.C.H.R. ultimately held that the interference was not
disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued in light of the fact
202
that it “answered a pressing social need.” It further held “that the
194. See Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2549 (1997) (lending significance
to the fact that Zana made the statements at issue in an atmosphere charged with
social tension in the wake of a terrorist attack).
195. See id. (noting the significance of the leader’s role as a public figure and the
publication of his statements in a national publication as further support for
government’s need to diffuse a potentially volatile situation).
196. See id. at 68.
197. Id. at 70.
198. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 89 (including statements of party leaders tending to
show that the Welfare Party extolled violence as a legitimate means to its political
end).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 90 (stating that excessive state intervention would not be a
permissible means to protect the social need).
201. See id. at 91 (describing how the Welfare Party was still a viable political force
despite the government crackdown).
202. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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grounds cited by the Constitutional Court to justify the Welfare
Party’s dissolution and the temporary forfeiture of certain political
203
rights by the other applicants were relevant and sufficient.”
Accordingly, the E.C.H.R. concluded that the Welfare Party’s
204
proscription did not violate Article 11.
Only three years earlier, in Socialist Party, the E.C.H.R. employed a
similar analysis in reaching an opposite conclusion holding that
Turkey’s dissolution of the Socialist Party constituted a violation of
205
Article 11.
In dissolving the Socialist Party, the Turkish
Constitutional Court provided two justifications for its decision.
According to the government, the Socialist Party promoted the
establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish federation thus undermining the
national unity and threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish
206
State. The government also likened the Socialist Party to a terrorist
organization and claimed that it was incompatible with Articles 11
207
and 17 of the Convention.
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Socialist Party,
208
liquidated its assets, and transferred them to the Treasury.
Additionally, the Constitutional Court’s order banned the party’s
founders and managers from holding office in any other political
209
party.
The Socialist Party argued that it had always defended the integrity
of the Turkish State and denied the proposal of any solution to the
210
Kurdish problem that would preclude such State unity.
The
Socialist Party also asserted that the federal system that it supported
would promote the peaceful coexistence of Turks and Kurds thus
211
safeguarding the integrity of the Turkish Republic.
Conversely, the government argued that the Socialist Party had
212
begun to espouse a progressively more overt policy of separatism. It
asserted that, in invoking a Kurdish right to self-determination, the
203. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
204. Id.
205. App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1998).
206. See id. at 61 (foreclosing the feasibility of the existence of two nations within
the Republic of Turkey regardless of the ethnic origin of its citizens).
207. See id. (stating that despite a difference in means employed, “objectives
which . . . encouraged separatism and incited a socially integrated community to
fight for the creation of an independent federated State were unacceptable”).
208. See id. at 60 (noting that, despite liquidation of their assets, the Socialist Party
never suffered any financial injury).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 68.
211. Id. (noting that a federation, and not a confederation, would protect Kurdish
interests while simultaneously maintaining the unity of the Turkish state).
212. Id. (stating the government’s concern about growing separatist movements
among Kurdish groups).
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Socialist Party was attempting to polarize the population into ethnic
minorities and majorities, in contravention of the principle of
213
It rested its claim on speeches of the Party’s
national unity.
chairman in which he allegedly sought to vindicate the use of
violence and terrorist methods calling for insurgency aimed at the
214
establishment of a separate state within Turkish territory.
On appeal before the E.C.H.R., all parties stipulated to the
prescription by law of the dissolution. The E.C.H.R. further
determined that the prohibition of activity that could jeopardize the
territorial integrity of the Turkish State constituted a protection of
national security and thus a “legitimate aim” within the meaning of
215
Article 11.
The E.C.H.R. concluded, however, that the dissolution of the
216
political party was not necessary in a democratic society.
In
reaching this determination, the E.C.H.R. again examined statements
of party leaders finding that the Socialist Party and its chairman had
employed pacific and lawful political means to achieve their
217
objective. The E.C.H.R. deferred in large part to the findings of the
213. Id. at 69 (claiming that “[t]he concept of national unity is based on equal
rights for all citizens without distinction.”).
214. Id. at 58 (including oral statements of the party’s chairman invoking the
expression “Ayaga kalk” [stand up] as evidence of inciting political violence). In
order to evidence the violent policy of the Socialist Party, the government proffered
extracts from its publications and various statements of its chairman. Id. at 55-59.
Excerpts from Socialist Party publications make consistent reference to the assertion
of Kurdish rights including statements such as “[t]he second dynamic is the Kurdish
dynamic. It is the call for equality and freedom, [it is] the Kurds’ claim to rights as a
nation.” Id. at 55. Statements from the Socialist Party chairman include the
following remarks that he made at a public meeting in calling for the Kurdish people
to unite in asserting their right to self-determination:
The Kurdish and Turkish nations should have the same rights. The Kurdish
and Turkish nations will form a popular republic . . . . It is the Socialist Party
that is with the oppressed Kurdish people . . . . By standing up, the Kurdish
people have begun to demonstrate the combat they have been waging for
years . . . . The Kurdish people will bring about a new revolution . . . . The
oppressed Kurdish people . . . are coming to join the Socialist Party . . . .
Long live the awakening! Long live our people!
Id. at 59.
215. Id. at 80-81.
216. Id. at 84-85.
217. See id. at 83 (noting that “the publications did not contain anything intended
to encourage extremist or terrorist groups to destroy the constitutional order of the
State or to found a Kurdish State through the use of force.”). The court noted with
regard to the chairman’s statements, that Article 10 freedom of expression
necessarily informs all Article 11 analysis. Id. It stated that such protections extend
not only to ideas “favourably received . . . but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb.” Id. In finding that nothing in the chairman’s statements alluded to his
condoning or promoting the use of violence, the court found that he had in reality
spoken out against “the former culture idolising [sic] violence and advocating the
use of force to solve problems between nations and in society . . . .” Id. at 57. The
court declined to find any infringement on the rules of democracy and failed to

SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC

11/3/2003 11:47 AM

1566

[Vol. 52:1531

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Commission in holding that the restriction in question was radical:
the government had dissolved the party with immediate and
permanent effect, liquidated its assets, and banned its leaders from
218
engaging in political activity.
The E.C.H.R. stated that while it
would take into account the background of the cases before it,
particularly the difficulties associated with the prevention of
terrorism, in this case it found no reason to doubt the Socialist Party’s
219
compliance with democratic practices. In support of its finding the
E.C.H.R. noted, as evidenced in various speeches, that the Socialist
Party had no immediate intention of undermining the national
220
integrity of the Turkish State.
It concluded that the government
had failed to prove that the statements upon which it based its case
demonstrated the Socialist Party’s espousal of violence as a political
method or were in any way responsible for the terrorist threat in
221
Turkey.
C. Consonance of Spanish Measures with the E.C.H.R.’s Article 11
Jurisprudence
Pursuant to its Article 11 jurisprudence, the E.C.H.R. will likely
uphold the proscription of Batasuna. In the instant case, the first
element of prescription by law will not prove problematic as the Law
of Political Parties provides expressly for the dissolution of political
222
parties as do Article 22 of the Constitution and Article 129 of the
223
Spanish Penal Code.
distinguish such statements from those that political groups in other European
countries had made. Id. at 85.
218. Id. at 60.
219. See id. at 86 (noting the relevance of a nation’s history with terrorism in
construing the threat that a particular party poses to the security of that nation).
220. See id. at 87 (finding no relationship between the statements of party leaders
and the terrorist threat in Turkey).
221. Id. at 86-87 (emphasizing that the fact that a political platform is at odds with
an existing political structure is not a threat, per se, to the institution of democracy.)
The court noted that, despite references to a Kurdish right to secede, the statements
at issue, when read in context, did not advocate for secession as much as they
militated for the establishment of a federal state pursuant to a popular referendum.
Id. at 71.
222. While the Constitution explicitly refers only to the dissolution of associations,
the Spanish Constitutional Court has determined that political parties constitute
associations for the purposes of Article 22. S.T.C. 85/1986.
223. See C.E. art. 22 (providing for the dissolution or suspension of an association
only by means of a resolution from the appropriate judicial entity); see also C.P. arts.
129 & 520 (vesting in the judiciary the authority to dissolve an illicit association and
close its businesses, offices and establishments for a period not to exceed five years).
Article 515 of the Penal Code defines “illicit” associations, inter alia, as terrorist
organizations, those that have as their objective the commission of a crime, and those
that promote discrimination, hate or violence against persons, groups or associations
based on ideology, race, ethnicity, nationality or religion or beliefs. C.P. art. 515.
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The E.C.H.R. will also likely find that Spain’s ban on Batasuna
served a legitimate aim. In both Turkish cases, the court held that at
224
With regard to the
least one of the State’s aims was legitimate.
proscription of the Socialist Party, the E.C.H.R. determined that the
protection of territorial integrity furthered the interest of national
225
security and thus constituted a legitimate aim.
Similarly, Spain’s
actions against Batasuna were not only in the interests of national
security and territorial integrity but also were necessary to ensure
public safety and protect the rights and freedoms of others, all of
226
which are legitimate aims as expressly defined in Article 11. In light
224. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 76-78
(2002) (agreeing with the Constitutional Court that the preservation of secularism
was necessary in order to protect national security, public safety, the rights and
freedoms of others, and to prevent disorder or crime). All such interests constitute
legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 11. Id. See also Socialist Party v. Turkey,
App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 80-81 (1998) (holding that the
proscription of the Socialist Party in furtherance of national security constituted a
legitimate aim); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2547 (1997) (finding a
legitimate aim in the protection of territorial integrity and crime prevention). This
case proves especially instructive in evaluating Batasuna’s dissolution. The applicant
in Zana made statements demonstrating his support for the armed separatist struggle
which the PKK, an illegal terrorist organization, was waging against the central
Turkish government. Id. at 2549 (citing remarks in which the applicant referred to
the acts of violence committed by PKK militants as part of a “national liberation
struggle”). The Commission concluded, and the Court agreed, that such comments,
coming from persons of a certain political status, could “reasonably lead the national
authorities to fear a stepping up of terrorist activities in the country.” Id. at 2546-47
(holding that Turkey’s actions constituted the “legitimate aims” of preserving
territorial integrity, and preventing crime).
225. Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81.
226. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 332 (identifying the subsidiary effects of alleged
HB-E.T.A coordination as affronts to the life, security, freedom and patrimony of
persons and public institutions with the goal of subverting constitutional order and
public peace). The temporary proscription of Batasuna, as an entity inextricably
linked with E.T.A., serves the interests of national security and public safety. Id. See
also L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement § I (identifying the law’s objective as one of
guaranteeing fundamental freedoms of the citizenry and preventing political parties
from employing policies predicated on violence, terror, and the violation of the
rights and freedoms of others); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 5
(describing the atmosphere of intimidation that plagues the lives of those Basques
who do not identify with the goals of Batasuna and E.T.A.). The Public Prosecutor
asserts that, in collaborating with E.T.A. to create such an atmosphere, Batasuna has
infringed upon the freedoms of opinion, expression, education, press, movement of
the Basque population and the right to hold elected office. See id. (noting that the
confluence of pro-E.T.A. propaganda and terrorist attacks on newspapers,
journalists, professors, and politicians have resulted in the domestic exile of many
Basques and an atmosphere of trepidation throughout the Basque Country). The
Ministry of the Interior issued a report chronicling the effects of terrorism on the
freedom of expression in the Basque Country during 2002. The report cited a study
conducted in the University of the Basque Country concluding that ten percent of
Basque journalists have received threats from E.T.A. and further, that three-quarters
of the journalists surveyed consider that the exercise of their profession in Euskadi is
different from the experience of journalists in any other region due to the threats
and attacks of E.T.A. and the volatile climate of confrontation and political pressure.
OFICINA DE RELACIONES INFORMATIVAS Y SOCIALES, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR,
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of the E.C.H.R.’s precedent, such objectives will surely constitute
227
legitimate aims within the meaning of its Article 11 jurisprudence.
Finally, the E.C.H.R. will likely hold that Batasuna’s proscription
was “necessary in a democratic society” thus satisfying the final
228
element. The factors that the E.C.H.R. employed in its analyses of
Refah Partisi and Socialist Party apply with equal force through analogy
and advocate more strongly in favor of the measure’s consonance
with the E.C.H.R.’s jurisprudence.
Whereas in Refah Partisi, the dissolution sought to prevent the
establishment of a plurality of legal systems and, in Spain, the divisive
element is nationality rather than religion, the implications for the
affected community are analogous. Any plan for autonomy, shared
or otherwise, would subject those citizens who recognize their
Spanish identity to a legal and political regime with which they do
not identify. Statistically, the majority of Basque citizens regard
themselves not as exclusively Basque, but rather recognize a dual
identity. Further, only nineteen percent of the population supports
229
secession from Spain.
Any State concessions toward the secession
of the Basque Country would similarly do away with the Spanish
State’s role as a guarantor of individual rights and freedoms forcing
CRONOLOGÍA—2002 “E.T.A. CONTRA LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN” [OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, CHRONOLOGY 2002—
“E.T.A. AGAINST THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION”], at http://www.mir.es/oris/prensa/
2002.htm (last visited June 29, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
227. The court has not had occasion to expound significantly on this prong of the
Article 11 test, as it has not generally served as a grounds for contention. See United
Communist Party v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20 (1998) (holding that the
dissolution of the Communist party on the grounds that it promoted a distinction
between Turks and Kurds pursued the legitimate aims of territorial integrity and
national security); Zana, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2547 (finding that a restriction on the
freedom of expression of a political figure who verbalized his support for the PKK
terrorist movement furthered the legitimate aims of preservation of territorial
integrity and the prevention of crime). The court in United Communist Party did note,
however, that a proscription based solely on the party’s use of the word “communist”
in its name would not satisfy any of the legitimate aims set forth in Article 11. 62 Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 20.
228. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 (voicing that a state may apply such
severe measures in only the most serious cases); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86
(imposing strict construction of Article 11 exceptions in the context of political
parties and noting that “only convincing and compelling reasons can justify
restrictions on such parties’ freedoms of association”); see also United Communist Party,
62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (establishing that political proscription is subject to rigorous
scrutiny and holding that Turkey’s dissolution of the Communist Party constituted a
violation of Article 11).
229. See LUIS MORENO, THE FEDERALIZATION OF SPAIN 5 & 8 n.6 (John Laughlin ed.,
2001) (reporting that approximately fifty-seven percent of Basque citizens claim a
dual identity thus diminishing the viability of secession as a solution and also that
only approximately twenty-seven percent of the citizenry identifies itself as exclusively
Basque).
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the State to concede all exercise of authority over the region to the
autonomous government. Such a concession would also fail to
achieve the balance to which the court referred in Refah Partisi
between claims of one group to be governed by their own rules and
230
the interests of the rest of the Basque population. As the majority
of the Basque population has expressed equal allegiance to Spain as
to the Basque Country, in permitting secession the Spanish State
would effectively permit the Ulsterization of the nation, that is, the
polarization of the population into nationalist and loyalist factions
231
resulting in a continental Northern Ireland.
Both Refah Partisi and Socialist Party demonstrate that the E.C.H.R.
routinely lends compelling weight to the party’s declared position
232
regarding violence as a political method. A similar argument forms
the crux of the Government’s contention regarding Batasuna’s role
233
in the perpetuation of terrorist violence. Both the Government and
the Public Prosecutor have thoroughly documented not only
Batasuna’s expression of solidarity with E.T.A.’s cause of Basque
autonomy but also its acceptance of the violent means employed to
234
that end.
For example, one of Batasuna’s National Cabinet
members threatened, “if President Aznar wants war, the abertzale [left]
235
Also,
and Euskal Herria [Basque Country] will respond with war.”
on August 11, 2002, at a rally in San Sebastian, members of the
Batasuna directorate were involved in cheers supporting E.T.A, “gora
236
E.T.A. militarra” [long live E.T.A.].
Just as Zana’s comments came
at a time of particular societal tension, Batasuna’s statements
230. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 (explaining that a bifurcated “system
would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination between individuals
as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms”).
231. Giles Tremlett, Basques Back Poll on Free State, GUARDIAN (London) (Oct. 28,
2002) (noting that critics of Ibarretxe’s plan for a free state have suggested that it
could result in the discrimination of non-Basques who have settled in the region),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,2763,820526,00.html (on file
with the American University Law Review). The article noted that a study showed
that one in five Basques feared the plan’s implications for non-native Basques. Id.
232. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 88 (holding that statements of party
leaders revealed the party’s acceptance of violence as a political method and its
animus toward the central State); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 84 (concluding
that the chairman’s statements did not advocate violence or encourage secession
from Turkey).
233. The prevention of such political participation in terrorist enterprise was the
impetus behind the Law of Political Parties. See L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement § I
(recognizing the importance of identifying those political parties that base their
political activities on violence, terror, discrimination, exclusion, and violation of the
freedoms and rights of others).
234. See generally PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 20; GOVERNMENT’S
COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 19-28.
235. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 20.
236. Id. at 19.
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immediately followed a brutal E.T.A. attack that claimed the lives of a
fifty-seven-year-old man and a six-year-old girl at a beach resort,
revealing the party’s constructive support for the violent means
237
E.T.A. employs to achieve its political aims.
Further, just as the E.C.H.R. lent probative weight to the Welfare
Party’s failure to disassociate itself with the more radical factions that
extolled the use of political violence, so the Government, the Public
Prosecutor, Garzón, and the Supreme Court have identified
Batasuna’s similar failure as evidence of its complicity with E.T.A.’s
terrorist enterprise. Such complicity is reflected in the Supreme
Court’s use of the term “double militancy” to refer to those members
238
of the Batasuna party who also maintain connections to E.T.A.
Currently, four of Batasuna’s seven parliamentarians, including party
239
spokesman Arnaldo Otegi, have been convicted of terrorist crimes.
In further demonstrating Batasuna’s complicity with E.T.A., not only
did the Supreme Court cite Batasuna’s lone abstention from various
240
non-partisan declarations against the use of violence, but it also
identified explicit statements in which Batasuna’s spokesman Arnaldo
Otegi exhorted the Basque Government to “disobey the State [or]
241
assume the consequences.”
Following the issuance of Garzón’s
order, Otegi also made statements denouncing the judge as a puppet
of the Spanish state and warned that the “Basque people were
organizing themselves for a fight . . . so that a Spanish fascist would
never again be able to dictate to the Basques what they must learn
242
nor the form that their internal institutions must assume.”
Like
those of Zana and the Welfare Party, Batasuna’s statements clearly
237. See id. at 12-13 (lending significance to the fact that Batasuna was the only
party that refused to sign on to the condemnation); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra
note 106, at 19 (noting that Otegi, Batasuna’s spokesman, justified the attacks as the
product of the State’s ineffective political policy).
238. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 10-19.
239. Id.; see also GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 12-13.
240. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 20-22 (noting Batasuna’s
consistent refusal to condemn E.T.A. attacks); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note
88, at 12-14 (noting that Batasuna representatives at all echelons of the Spanish
government uniformly refused to sign the non-partisan condemnations of recent
E.T.A. attacks); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 20-21 (observing
Batasuna’s failure to sign the multi-lateral condemnation which expressed sympathy
for the families of the victims and demanded the dissolution of E.T.A.). The Basque
Nationalist Party signed the condemnation as did the traditionally antagonistic
Popular Party. Id. Batasuna has expressly stated that its refusal to condemn the acts
of E.T.A. is a symbol of its identity, further supporting its complicity with the terrorist
organization. Id.
241. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 19-20.
242. See GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 19-28 (enumerating
Batasuna’s violations of the Law of Political Parties since its effective date in order to
address issues of retroactivity).
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reflect not only its tacit support for E.T.A.’s terrorist campaign but
243
also evidence its affirmative complicity with the organization.
Consequently, its dissolution analogously serves a “pressing social
need.”
Finally, regarding proportionality, whereas both of the Turkish
decisions prohibited party members from running for office for five
years, neither judicial decision nor the relevant law precludes
Batasuna’s representatives from occupying their electoral seats or
from running in future elections under the auspices of another
244
party.
Furthermore, whereas the dissolutions in both Refah Partisi
and Socialist Party were permanent and immediate, with no provision
for domestic recourse or independent judicial review, the Supreme
Court’s proscription of Batasuna followed a temporary suspension for
245
investigative purposes and also provides for appeal before the
246
The Spanish measure thus provides a
Constitutional Court.
comprehensive system of safeguards to insure not only the factual
propriety of the dissolution, but also effective and independent
247
judicial review.
The dissolution, preceded by a temporary and
limited precautionary measure, when weighed against the severity of
the threat it seeks to prevent, belies any serious claim of
243. Also relevant to the question of complicity is the fact that Batasuna’s
spokesman, Otegi, shares his parliamentary seat with Josu Ternera who is currently
under Supreme Court subpoena, wanted for his involvement in a 1987 E.T.A. attack
that claimed the lives of eleven people. See PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88,
at 7 (noting that in 1990, a French court convicted ex-E.T.A. director, Ternera, of
membership in a terrorist organization); Justicia presenta los 23 cargos contra Batasuna
[Justice Presents 23 Charges Against Batasuna], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (enumerating the
twenty-three charges that the Ministry of Justice filed against Batasuna in its report
on Aug. 21, 2002), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/dossieres/leydepartidos/
23cargos.html (last visted Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
244. ORDER, supra note 8, at 343. In anticipation of the Basque elections in May,
2003, a new party recently applied for inscription in the political register. M. Alonso,
Elkarri se ofrece a los proetarras para que puedan concurrir a las elecciones [The Elkarri Party
Volunteers to Represent E.T.A. Supporters So That They May Participate in Elections], ABC
(Feb. 14, 2003) (reporting that the party hoped to provide an alternative legal
platform under which ex-Batasuna members could run in the May elections).
245. C.P. arts. 192 & 520 (limiting a lower court’s suspension or dissolution to a
period of five years); ORDER, supra note 8, at 344 (setting the suspension’s duration at
three years renewable up to five years).
246. See L.O.P.P. art. 11 (providing for appeal in the form of the protective appeal
before the Constitutional Court); SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 198
(stating that the decision is final subject to review only before the Constitutional
Court).
247. See Finn, supra note 169, at 68 (noting the importance of the incorporation of
a mechanism for judicial review of political proscription); JOHN E. FINN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 134 (1991)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS] (noting that “the proscription process, if it is
to be retained, must be redrafted to include an objective standard capable of
independent review . . . ”).
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disproportionality. When viewed in light of relevant E.C.H.R.
jurisprudence, it is likely that the proscription of Batasuna will survive
any potential Article 11 challenge.
IV. EFFECTS OF PROSCRIPTION ON TERRORISM AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL PROSCRIPTION IN COMBATING
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Justice Felix Frankfurter once warned that “[f]ocusing attention on
constitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with
248
wisdom.”
Thus, limiting the consideration of proscription to the
foregoing legal analysis, without a pragmatic inquiry into its practical
effects, would be of doubtful utility to nations considering the
249
incorporation of such a measure into a counter-terrorism strategy.
Proscription generally serves two classes of objectives: one practical
250
The practical rationale for
and the other presentational.
proscription looks to the measure’s pragmatic effects on the
251
incidence of political violence within a given country.
More
commonly, however, proscription serves a presentational purpose in
affording a State the appearance of intransigence in its crusade
252
against terrorism.
With regard to practical analyses, empirical evidence is of
consummate importance in evaluating the efficacy of restrictions on
253
political freedoms.
However, discord plagues the debate over the
merits of political proscription, which suffers from a pronounced and
248. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (upholding the conviction of three defendants under the Smith Act for
conspiracy to organize the Communist Party as a group advocating the overthrow of
the Government by force).
249. See Finn, supra note 169, at 65 (providing that “[a] policy that may be justified
as a matter of constitutional theory is not for that reason alone a good policy”).
250. See HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 143, 246 (explaining that the
presentational rationale for proscription attempts “to remove public manifestations
of the existence of, and support for, terrorist[s] rather than to prevent terrorism as
such”).
251. See id. (finding that the Prevention of Terrorism Act served the practical
purpose of easing prosecution).
252. See Finn, supra note 169, at 66 (identifying four functions of proscription:
legitimating, integrating, socializing, and systematizing); Walter F. Murphy, Excluding
Political Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory, in GERMANY AND ITS
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 173 (Paul
Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (discouraging states from employing the
presentational rationale as its sole justification for banning a political party).
253. See Finn, supra note 169, at 67 (“[A]nalysis of the relationship between
democracy and violence should be informed by empirical evidence and by detailed
case studies.”); Dan Gordon, Limits on Extremist Political Parties: A Comparison of Israeli
Jurisprudence With That of the United States and Germany, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 347, 392 (1987) (determining that empirical evidence could prove decisive in
reaching conclusions regarding the necessity and efficacy of political proscription).
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254

often cited dearth of empirical research.
An analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages commonly associated with political
255
proscription juxtaposed with the experiences of other Western
256
democracies will serve as the rubric under which this section will
attempt to lend preliminary insight into the promise of proscription
in combating political violence in the Basque Country.
Many Western nations currently provide for the proscription of
257
political parties either statutorily or constitutionally.
The
experiences of these nations have produced useful paradigms for
analyzing the utility of Batasuna’s proscription.
258
The failure of the Weimar Republic provided fodder for the most
259
Inherent in this
compelling arguments in favor of proscription.
254. See Finn, supra note 169, at 56 (noting the empirical void that exists in
scholarly research regarding the practical effects of proscription on political
terrorism); Gordon, supra note 253, at 385 (criticizing both opponents and
proponents of proscription for employment of statistical claims in the absence of any
compelling empirical evidence). “The dearth of unambiguous empirical data in an
area where such evidence would be decisive may account for the rarefied character
of much of this debate.” Id.
255. See Finn, supra note 169, at 65-67 (discussing both the virtues and potential
vices inherent in any State’s decision to ban a political party); see also Gordon, supra
note 253, at 392 (addressing the continuing nature of the debate over the efficacy of
political proscription and comparing the arguments that have emerged on both sides
of that debate).
256. See Murphy, supra note 252, at 188 (noting the failure of political proscription
to effectively suppress the popular opinions propounded by the suspended parties);
see also CHALK, supra note 1, at 103 (finding that the repressive policy in Italy resulted
in a restriction upon the rights of citizens without correlative success in counterterrorism efforts). “[T]he widespread use of crime by association . . . merely had the
effect of increasing support for and recruitment to left-wing terrorist organizations.”
Id.
257. See Finn, supra note 169, at 70-73 (enumerating the various nations that
currently maintain provisions allowing for the bans on political parties including
Western democracies such as Austria, France, Germany, the Republic of Ireland,
Northern Ireland, Israel and Italy); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-805 to -806 (1956 &
Supp. 2002) (incorporating legislation that remains as a vestige of the United States’
anti-Communist crusade). Section 16-806 reads in pertinent part:
The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such
party . . . the object of which is to overthrow by force or violence the
government of the United States, or the government of the state of
Arizona . . . shall not be entitled to be recognized or certified as a political
party under the laws of the state of Arizona and shall not be entitled to any
of the privileges, rights or immunities attendant upon legal political bodies
recognized under the laws of the state of Arizona . . . .
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-806.
HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 138 (describing the proscription provisions that
have existed in Northern Ireland in various forms since that country’s enactment of
the Criminal Law and Proceedings Act of 1887). The authors note that the British
government employed these provisions to outlaw a number of political organizations
during the course of the “Troubles.” Id. Sinn Fein, once regarded as the political
front for the Irish Republican Army, numbered among those proscribed
organizations until it became legal in 1974. Id.
258. The Weimar Republic was the failed experiment in democracy that
succeeded the collapse of the German monarchy at the conclusion of World War I.
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argument is the concept of the “militant democracy” which asserts
that “the polity need not commit suicide by allowing those people
See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN, AND
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 17 (1997) (providing a concise history of the rise and
fall of the Weimar Republic). A popularly elected National Assembly convened in
the German city of Weimar in 1919 to create a new constitutional regime. Id. It
drafted the two-part constitution and created the Republic of the Reich. Id. at 18.
This new constitution, however, was plagued with fatal internal contradictions. Id. at
20 (noting that the constitution required the Reichstag to supervise the president’s
use of his emergency powers but also allowed the president to dissolve the
Reichstag). Scholars have argued that the demise of the Weimar Republic resulted
less from the abuse of the president’s extensive emergency powers employed by
Hitler to dismantle the Republic, and more from the Republic’s fatally equivocal
stance with regard to proscription. See Finn, supra note 169, at 63 (postulating that
Weimar’s demise lay in its failure to ban the National Socialist Party).
259. See Finn, supra note 169, at 63 (asserting that “Weimar fell because it could
not respond to challenges to constitutionalism disguised in the language of
democratic legality.”) (internal quotation omitted). Professor Finn explains the
dominant theory regarding the failure of Weimarian politics. He asserts that the
Weimerian ideology was formed in large part by the jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen
who extolled the virtues of the “equal chance doctrine.” Id. at 64. This doctrine
essentially “held that anyone willing to abide by the formal rules of electoral
procedure could contest for power . . . [and did not limit participation] to political
parties committed to the maintenance of constitutional democracy.” Id. A common
condemnation of Weimarian politics derives from Carl Schmitt’s critical response to
the Kelsenian theory outlined above. Schmitt rejected the equal chance doctrine
and argued that such liberalism is inherently self-subverting. DYZENHAUS, supra note
258, at 65. Schmitt postulated that in allowing all parties equal access to the political
process, regardless of their attitude toward the maintenance of democracy, the State
creates the risk that an anti-democratic party may employ the legal political system to
gain the power that will later allow it to bring about the destruction of that very same
system. Id. (arguing that untempered political liberalism will allow an antidemocratic party to “shut behind [it] the door of legality through which [it] had
entered.”). Weimar’s failure arguably lies in its refusal to proscribe the Nazi party,
thus preventing it from legitimately gaining the control that later allowed it to
destroy the democratic regime. CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS, supra note 247, at 156.
One of the most common criticisms of the Weimar Republic was its failure to
prohibit the National Socialist Party from participating in elections. Finn, supra note
169, at 63. See also Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, Constitutional Crisis: The
German and the American Experience, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 1, 14
(Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000) (noting that the Weimar
Republic’s last presidential cabinet transformed into a National Socialist
dictatorship).
260. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 83
(2002) (classifying Turkey as a militant democracy); Finn, supra note 169, at 64
(contextualizing the use of political proscription in nascent democracies); see also
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 222 (1989) (explaining that the concept of the militant democracy in
Germany derives from its experience with totalitarianism and dictatorship and was
enshrined in numerous provisions of the country’s Basic Law). Kommers elaborates
on this principle identifying its emergence as a product of the ailing Weimar
Republic, “namely its tolerance of extremist parties bent on destroying democracy.”
Id. The vulnerability of nascent democracies to the threats embodied in radical
parties produced the perceived need to provide a mechanism by which democratic
regimes could exclude those parties from political processes thereby preserving the
integrity of the nation. Id. (identifying the manifestation of the notion of the
militant democracy in various articles of the German Basic Law). Kommers
specifically references Article 21(2) which provides that “[p]arties which, by reason
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who [reject the political order] to utilize its free and open processes
261
In accordance with this
to demolish those very processes.”
principle, proponents of proscription argue, with notable force in the
262
case of Batasuna,
that no justification exists for depriving a
democracy of the means to defend itself against a party that seeks to
263
This thesis is compelling with regard to
undermine its legitimacy.
the Spanish government’s right to protect itself from those factions,
such as Batasuna, that seek to destroy the Spanish State as it exists
today.
One risk inherent in the employment of proscription is its
264
potential for abuse.
The slippery slope argument posits that
of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free
democratic basic order or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of
Germany, shall be unconstitutional.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
261. Murphy, supra note 252, at 180 (concluding that “[i]n short, a democracy
may punish or exclude those whose clear aim is to destroy the system.”).
262. Spain arguably falls within the “defending democracy” paradigm
promulgated in research regarding liberal state responses to political violence and
terrorism. See Pedahzur, supra note 169, at 5 (establishing a tripartite rubric under
which to examine the correlation between the degrees of repression employed in
combating political violence and the level of democratic infrastructure characteristic
of each of three nations: Israel, Germany, and the United States). In her analysis,
the author cites three classes of democracies: “militant,” “defending,” and
“immunized.” Id. The “defending democracy” paradigm has elicited various
definitions and is generally regarded as a type of democracy that excludes individuals
or organizations, the aims of which “may endanger the state, its political regime or
the basic national consensus.” Id. Such states will exclude political parties from
elections so long as there is constitutional or legislative predicate for doing so and
generally rely on a criminal justice model in responding to terrorism. Id. at 13. As
distinguished from the militant and defending models, the author identifies the
“immunized democracy” as representative of a Lockian liberal approach with
“minimal penetration of the state into the social sphere.” Id. at 14-15. Such a state
operates wholly within the boundaries of the law and subjects all state responses to
violence to judicial review. Id. at 15. These states will generally exclude a party from
free elections only upon finding that it “constitutes a clear and present danger to the
regime and consequently to the society.” Id. at 15. The United States is exemplary of
the “immunized democracy.” Id.
263. See Murphy, supra note 252, at 191 (explaining that the theory of a militant
democracy “allows government to exclude certain kinds of peaceful efforts to change
the system.”); see also Finn, supra note 169, at 64 (stating that “proscription hopes to
save democracy from its own excesses.”).
264. See Finn, supra note 169, at 67 (citing the utility of an inquiry into how and in
what ways the decision to ban parties may have provided the basis for further state
activities designed to censor or harass anti-democratic forces in assessing the
possibility for abuse). Finn cited a study, which demonstrated that following the
German decision to proscribe the Communist party, preliminary inquisitions from
state prosecutors increased from 7,975 to 12,600 the following year. Id. (citing
Donald P. Kommers, The Spiegel Affair: A Case Study in Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL
TRIALS 15 (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1971)); see also Gordon, supra note 253, at 391
(positing that bans hold dangerous potential to become legitimate State weapons of
political struggle). While acknowledging the potential for abuse, the author claims
that empirical evidence suggests that a slippery slope does not exist. Id. at 392.
Gordon notes that despite the proscriptions of two parties in both Israel and
Germany, there is no evidence to suggest that they have or will lead to similar action
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proscribing one group “pushes other groups to the brink of
265
This argument fails, however, to distinguish between
illegality.”
terrorist fronts like Batasuna and opposition parties, like the P.N.V.,
that conform their activities to standards inherent in societies
266
governed by the rule of law.
In Spain, such distinctions are of paramount importance in
illustrating that the proscription of Batasuna has as its foundation not
the prohibition of an ideology but rather of the means employed in
267
promoting that ideology.
For example, the Basque Nationalist
Party was one of the most influential promulgators of a Basque
nationalist policy yet operates wholly within the institution of national
268
mainstream politics.
Opponents of proscription often speculate that bans will serve only
269
to romanticize the cause, converting its fallen soldiers into martyrs.
against any other party or organization in either nation. Id.
265. Gordon, supra note 253, at 391. While often problematic, such concerns
resound in the recent decision of the National Court’s Public Prosecutor to initiate a
similar proceeding against the Communist Party of Spain, the alleged political wing
of GRAPO, a leftist terrorist organization. See La fiscalía pide la suspensión del P.C.E.(r)
al considerar que es el brazo político de los GRAPO [The Public Prosecutor Requests the
Suspension of the P.C.E.(r) Alleging it to be the Political Arm of GRAPO], ESTRELLA DIGITAL
(reporting that the Public Prosecutor filed a request for the party’s suspension with
the National Court), at http://www.estrelladigital.es/021023/articulos/espana/
grapo.asp. (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review). This application to the National Court comes only two months after the
Public Prosecutor and the Government took similar action against Batasuna.
266. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 392 (noting the relative ease with which
governments can distinguish between extremist parties and traditional opposition
parties, “which accept ‘the rules of the game’”).
267. See generally ORDER, supra note 8 (enumerating, in extensive and extremely
precise detail, throughout approximately 350 pages of material supporting this
decision, the actions that evidence H.B.-E.H.-Batasuna’s connections with E.T.A.).
Judge Garzón’s order states that the objective of the ban is to prevent activity that
furthers terrorism and the subsidiary effects resulting therefrom. Id. In doing so he
claims that Batasuna allowed E.T.A. to use its headquarters to plan many of its
attacks, provided shelter to its members, contributed to the terrorization of the
citizenry, and defended the “institutional front” of the terrorist organization. Id.
268. See Mees, supra note 19, at 804 (identifying the Basque Nationalist Party as
instrumental in procuring a referendum regarding the Statute of Basque Autonomy
ratified in 1978). The author also credits Sabino Arana, the founder of the P.N.V.,
with providing the impetus for the influence that the party wielded in the 1980s. Farreaching Basque autonomy in matters of tax policy, education, industrial policy, and
justice evidences the power of the P.N.V. in effecting change in the Basque Country.
See id. at 809 (concluding that radical nationalists have never recognized these steps
in the process of Basque nation-building as they view autonomy as an obstacle to selfdetermination). Mees notes the cleavage that exists within the nationalist movement
between the majority, peaceful, and democratic wing and the minority faction that
condones the use of violence to vindicate its Basque identity. Id. at 805.
269. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 391 (arguing that the banned organization
could potentially gain strength from proscription); United in Error: Spain’s Ban on
Batasuna Will Not Help, supra note 14 (expressing the measure’s futility and
predicting that proscription will have the sole effect of converting Batasuna members
into martyrs).
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The argument continues that in making a martyr of the restricted
party, the State risks conceding a degree of its own legitimacy in
appearing that it feared allowing the people a genuine choice
270
between the existing system and the radical party’s platform. This
argument fails in the case of Spain as, among its supporters, E.T.A.
271
militants have already achieved a certain degree of martyrdom.
Additionally, the existence of legitimate political parties that advocate
for an autonomous Basque Country yet also function within bounds
of democracy belies the argument that the Spanish state fears a
272
challenge to its standing policy regarding Basque autonomy.
Proponents of proscription often make a contrary argument. They
assert that permitting a terrorist front to participate in elections
inherently confers upon it the legitimacy associated with law abiding
273
parties.
Bans can serve as a denunciation of the radical party’s
274
legitimacy in the eyes of the State and of democracy in general.
Proscription can further serve a presentational function,
demonstrating the State’s intransigent stance with regard to the
275
suppression of terrorism and instilling confidence in its citizenry.
270. Gordon, supra note 253, at 391; see also CHALK, supra note 1, at 99-103
(examining the effects of relatively repressive counter-terrorism measures in
democratic nations); Finn, supra note 169, at 66 (identifying the risk that
proscription could delegitimize the electoral process).
271. See Jose Manuel Mata, La estrategia de la insurrección [The Strategy of
Insurrection], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (reporting that one of the unifying factors of Batasuna
members is their common perception of incarcerated E.T.A. operatives as heroes), at
http://www.elpais.es/temas/dossiers/ledepartidos/batasuna.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).
272. See supra note 268 (discussing the role of P.N.V. as a political advocate for
Basque nationalism that nonetheless operates within the established political
mainstream).
273. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 390 (deriving support for this argument in the
case of the Israeli politician Meir Kahan). Gordon explains that had the Israeli
Supreme Court banned Kahan’s party from running in Knesset elections it could
have denied Kahan the legitimacy that afforded him a seat in the Congress and the
attendant protected speech that Israeli law confers on its members and thus “nipped
the ‘Kahanist’ phenomenon in the bud.” Id.
274. See id. (noting that the dichotomous nature of the positive effects often
associated with proscription weaken the target party while simultaneously
strengthening the ruling regime); see also WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113 (observing
that some legislation serves a symbolic function of “expressing public revulsion . . . and
reassuring the public that something is being done.”).
275. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 391 (observing that in banning the Socialist
Reich Party, the Bonn government achieved “the prestige which the vacillating
Weimar Republic never had”). Here, the author notes that the government’s
proscription of the Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party (KPD) did not
result in increased popular support for either party or a loss of confidence in the
strength of the nascent democratic regime. Id. See also HOGAN & WALKER, supra note
2, at 246 (articulating the “presentational” justification for proscription). The
authors derive this term from the Jellicoe Report on the Prevention of Terrorism Act
of 1976 in Northern Ireland. Id. The report justified the existence of the power to
proscribe as “presentational” rather than “practical” in that its object was “to remove
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Opponents also argue against the efficacy of bans stating that the
proscribed organizations will simply reappear under the guise of
another party or will employ some extra-parliamentary means to
276
reestablish support.
This reasoning similarly fails in the case of
Batasuna as the proscription Order expressly prohibits the party’s
277
constituents from reorganizing under any other name. Further, the
Law of Political Parties expressly articulates the conduct that may
result in proscription. Thus, should Batasuna reorganize under some
alternate guise, the Law of Political Parties and the Supreme Court’s
order would presumably render any such organization illegal and its
278
assets subject to seizure.
This seizure of assets is also an invaluable part of the Spanish
proscriptive legislation. Capital is the oxygen that allows a terrorist
enterprise to thrive and the seizure provision serves the extremely
279
practical purpose of denying a party the means by which it operates.
public manifestations of the existence of, and support for, terrorist organizations,
rather than to prevent terrorism as such.” Id.
276. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 389 (finding support for his view in the
reappearance of the DKP (German Communist Party) in West Germany pursuant to
the proscription of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany)). Gordon also cites
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which
expressed doubt regarding the “long range effectiveness of legislative bans in
stopping the rise of the Communist movement.” Id. at 389 n.255 (quoting Dennis,
341 U.S. at 578) (Jackson, J., concurring).
277. See L.O.P.P. art. 3 (prohibiting political parties from employing registration
materials that identify it or otherwise coincide with those of a suspended or
proscribed party); ORDER, supra note 8, at 344 (providing for the suspension of
activities undertaken in the names of H.B., E.H., Batasuna and any other name they
should choose to adopt).
278. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 108-09 (denying the
Prosecution’s request for a prospective ban including parties yet to be formed but
stating that any party that attempts to continue to serve as E.T.A.’s political wing may
expect a similar fate); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 63-64 (requesting
that the effects of the proscription extend to all new political parties formed to
circumvent the ruling as well as to any existing party which acts as a successor to the
banned party or continues its activities); La Fiscalia evitará que Batasuna concurra
‘camuflada’ a las proximas elecciones [The Public Prosecutor Will Preclude Batasuna from
Running in “Camouflage” in the Next Elections], EUROPA PRESS (Madrid/San Sebastian)
(Mar. 31, 2003) (reporting that the Attorney General stated that his office intends to
initiate proceedings against any party that it suspects of serving as a front for
Batasuna’s participation in the May elections), available at http://es.news.
yahoo.com/fot/ftxt/20030331195943.html (on file with the American University
Law Review).
279. See HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 143 (suggesting that seizing and
forfeiting assets and shutting down facilities are practical measures in curbing
political violence); see also Richards, supra note 9, at 79 (claiming that the British
government, in granting Sinn Fein the financial subsidies that all democratic parties
receive, “helped [the party] to achieve its highest electoral support in modern times,
before it resembled a democratic party”). Richards faults the government for granting
subsidies to Sinn Fein in the absence of any commensurate concessions from the
I.R.A., thus implicitly recognizing the correlation between the financial status of the
political front and the success of the terrorist organization. Id.
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This provision also lends legitimacy to the legislation in
demonstrating that the ban has concrete pragmatic effects and is not
280
merely an expression of State animus toward a particular party.
Finally, opponents argue that the efficacy of individualized
281
criminal sanctions belie the necessity of proscription.
This
approach has encountered criticism and, in practice, has proven
282
insufficient in responding to political violence.
Spain has long
since employed the “criminal justice model” in sanctioning political
283
As reflected in Batasuna’s consistent and extensive
violence.
collaboration with E.T.A., this less restrictive approach has proven
insufficient in deterring the party from supporting E.T.A.’s campaign
284
of terror. In addition to employing criminal sanctions, the Spanish
government has also ceded an extraordinary degree of autonomy to

280. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 390 (identifying the risk that citizens could
perceive the proscription of a party as an “admission of failure” on the part of the
State); see also Richards, supra note 9, at 85 (condemning the British government for
allowing the I.R.A. to make substantial electoral advances). The Supreme Court’s
opinion orders the dissolution of the party and the distribution of all proceeds from
the liquidation of Batasuna’s assets among its creditors along with the dissolution of
the party. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 196.
281. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 386 (citing Justice Barak of the Israeli
Supreme Court who identified the criminal justice system as one of the “accepted
tools with which the democracy can protect itself”). Barak argued that in the
presence of sufficient criminal sanctions there is “no need to take the drastic means
of denying the right to be elected.” Id.
282. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 223 (rejecting the sole use of the criminal justice
system due to the inefficacy of attempting to quell terrorism through employment of
law enforcement and criminal sanctions alone). Wilkinson argues that despite some
notable successes of this approach, it nonetheless retains certain serious
inadequacies. Id. For example, Wilkinson notes that in many nations, terrorists have
escaped the reach of criminal sanctions by fleeing abroad and continuing to operate
from outside their home nations. Id. at 224. Additionally, the author notes that it is
often exceedingly easy for convicted terrorists to continue operating from within
prison by influencing existing networks outside of the prison. Id.
283. See C.P. tit. XXI (enumerating among the “offenses against the Constitution:”
complicity with a terrorist organization, participation in an association that has as its
objective the commission of a crime, and membership in a terrorist organization).
284. For example, the Spanish Penal Code expressly prohibits membership in a
terrorist organization, yet these provisions have proved ineffective as Batasuna has
consistently allowed members of E.T.A. to figure among its ranks. See PROSECUTOR’S
COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 6-11 (naming those Batasuna members who maintain a
joint association with both the political party and E.T.A.); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT,
supra note 106, at 12 (identifying those members of Batasuna convicted of
collaborating with a terrorist organization); see also El Tribunal Supremo dicta orden de
busca y captura internacional para el parlamentario de Batasuna [Supreme Court Issues Order
for International Search and Capture of Batasuna’s Member of Parliament], ESTRELLA
DIGITAL (evidencing the failure of Batasuna representative Josu Ternera to appear at
two judicial proceedings and stating that his last appearance in public was in October
of 2002 in Switzerland), at http://www.estrella digital.es/imprimir.asp (last visited
June 29, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). The article states
that the Supreme Court is currently investigating Ternera for ordering the E.T.A.
attack of a Civil Guard’s quarters that resulted in the deaths of 11 people. Id.
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285

the Basque Country in its effort to appease nationalist factions. The
inefficacy of such action further illustrates that the law is the last
remaining means by which to insulate democratic society from the
286
deleterious effects of political parties associated with terrorism.
All democracies must regard proscriptive legislation with the
utmost suspicion and weigh its potential benefits carefully against the
287
inherent restriction on freedom that it imports.
However, the
foregoing analysis suggests that Batasuna’s proscription promises to
complement existing criminal sanctions by serving both practical and
288
presentational rationales for proscription —practical, in depriving
Batasuna and thus E.T.A. of its financial support, and presentational
in establishing a firm state position of intolerance for those political
parties that seek refuge in the freedoms that they undermine and
which are enshrined in the Constitution that they reject.
CONCLUSION
When considered with reference to recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence,
Spain’s proscription of Batasuna is likely to withstand any Article 11
challenge brought pursuant to the European Convention on Human
Rights. Political parties are obliged to operate within the bounds of

285. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113 (classifying the Statute of Basque
Autonomy as a form of “prophylaxis” or reform “designed to have a preventative
effect by attempting to redress underlying grievances that might otherwise lead to
extreme disaffection among sectors of the population”); see also Mees, supra note 19,
at 804 (observing that the Basque Government currently enjoys autonomy regarding
matters including education, taxation, industrial policy and justice).
286. Other research has found that, in certain circumstances, proscription
arguably represents the least restrictive alternative in confronting the actions of
political parties associated with terrorism. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 387 (noting
that those who argued in favor of a ban on the Kach party in Israel in 1984 “can now
argue that Kach’s strength increased so much from Kahan’s election to the Knesset in
1984” that any measure short of proscription would have proved insufficient).
Gordon also noted that “the victory of the National Front in the 1986 French
legislative elections was said to bestow legitimacy to its leader, Le Pen.” Id. at 387
n.246
287. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113, 115 (considering the way in which the
subsidiary effects of repressive counter-terrorism measures should factor into states’
consideration of whether to impose such restrictions). Wilkinson notes that in order
to insure the legitimacy and democratic accountability of anti-terrorist legislation,
civil authorities should control all aspects of its procurement and implementation
and provide for judicial review of its application. Id. at 117.
288. Generally writers have found the employment of the presentational rationale,
alone, as insufficient justification for banning a political party. See HOGAN & WALKER,
supra note 2, at 143 (arguing that states should retain proscription as a security
measure but should reject presentational grounds for such legislation). The authors
qualify their acceptance of proscription with two limiting principles. The first
qualification is the demonstrated necessity of “evidential shortcuts” and the second is
that the system adopted ensures that membership “is shorthand for criminal activity.”
Id.
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the Constitution and of established notions of democracy.
If a
given party, in aligning itself with a terrorist organization, chooses
not to do so, it may not, then, invoke those same constitutional
principles as a shield nor seek legal refuge in the very provisions that
290
it has chosen to violate.
Legislative and judicial tolerance of such
subversion would contravene the basic notions of democracy upon
which all legal systems are predicated. The newly ordained Law of
Political Parties and subsequent judicial measures represent a
coordinated and laudable national effort to lift from Batasuna the
political facade behind which reside nothing less than popularly
elected terrorists.
The inherent challenge for any democracy engaged in the struggle
against terrorism is always the reconciliation of individual civil
291
liberties with an effective and unequivocal counter-terrorism policy.
In light of the protracted struggle with terrorism that lies ahead, this
tension will necessarily inform the world’s legislative and judicial
responses. While it seems that Spain has succeeded in achieving that
292
delicate balance, the response of the international legal system will
ultimately define the juridical boundaries within which the nations of
293
the world must wage their offensives.
In an international
community torn between its dedication to the war on terrorism and
its veneration for democracy, states would be wise to heed the lessons
that Spain’s experience will offer as the international legal system will
be the force with which future counter-terrorism measures will have
to contend.
289. See supra note 166 (articulating the restrictions that the E.C.H.R. has imposed
on the activities of political parties pursuant to the European Convention on Human
Rights).
290. See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (serv. A) 45 (1961) (stating that “no
person may be able to take advantage of the provisions of the Convention to perform
acts aimed at destroying the aforesaid rights and freedoms”).
291. See supra note 4 (identifying the reconciliation of civil liberties with state
security as the greatest challenge for a democracy in confronting the threat of
terrorism).
292. The Law of Political Parties has resulted in a clear articulation of behaviors
that can lead to proscription, thus allowing parties to conform their activities to
objective standards. See L.O.P.P. art. 9 (enumerating, in detail, the activities that can
form the basis of a proscriptive order). Moreover, the law provides for independent
judicial review, thus protecting against the Government’s indiscriminate application
of its provisions. See id. art. 11 (providing for the protective appeal before the
Constitutional Court). Finally, the option of a temporary suspension lends itself to a
thorough investigation of the facts and will prevent the courts from precipitously
foreclosing on the legal and constitutional rights of a political party. See ORDER,
supra note 8 (stating that the purpose of the suspension was to facilitate the Court’s
factual investigation).
293. See Head, supra note 5, at 73 (anticipating the growing role that international
law and, more specifically, the European Convention on Human Rights will play in
determining the propriety of counter-terrorism measures).

